Chapter 50.

Divorce and Alimony.

Article 1.

Divorce, Alimony, and Child Support, Generally.

§ 50‑1.  Repealed by Session Laws 1971, c. 1185, s. 20.

 

§ 50‑2.  Bond for costs unnecessary.

It shall not be necessary for either party to a proceeding for divorce or alimony to give any undertaking to the other party to secure such costs as such other party may recover. (1871‑2, c. 193, s. 41; Code, s. 1294; Rev., s. 1558; C.S., s. 1656.)

 

§ 50‑3.  Venue; removal of action.

In all proceedings for divorce, the summons shall be returnable to the court of the county in which either the plaintiff or defendant resides.

[In] any action brought under Chapter 50 for alimony or divorce filed in a county where the plaintiff resides but the defendant does not reside, where both parties are residents of the State of North Carolina, and where the plaintiff removes from the State and ceases to be a resident, the action may be removed upon motion of the defendant, for trial or for any motion in the cause, either before or after judgment, to the county in which the defendant resides. The judge, upon such motion, shall order the removal of the action, and the procedures of G.S. 1‑87 shall be followed. (1871‑2, c. 193, s. 40; Code, s. 1289; Rev., s. 1559; 1915, c. 229, s. 1; C.S., s. 1657; 1977, 2nd Sess., c. 1223.)

 

§ 50‑4.  What marriages may be declared void on application of either party.

The district court, during a session of court, on application made as by law provided, by either party to a marriage contracted contrary to the prohibitions contained in the Chapter entitled Marriage, or declared void by said Chapter, may declare such marriage void from the beginning, subject, nevertheless, to G.S. 51‑3. (1871‑2, c. 193, s. 33; Code, s. 1283; Rev., s. 1560; C.S., s. 1658; 1945, c. 635; 1971, c. 1185, s. 21; 1973, c. 1; 1979, c. 525, s. 10.)

 

§ 50‑5.  Repealed by Session Laws 1983, c. 613, s. 1.

 

§ 50‑5.1.  Grounds for absolute divorce in cases of incurable insanity.

In all cases where a husband and wife have lived separate and apart for three consecutive years, without cohabitation, and are still so living separate and apart by reason of the incurable insanity of one of them, the court may grant a decree of absolute divorce upon  the petition of the sane spouse: Provided, if the insane spouse has been released on a trial basis to the custody of his or her respective spouse such shall not be considered as terminating the status of living "separate and apart" nor shall it be considered as constituting "cohabitation" for the purpose of this section nor shall it prevent the granting of a divorce as provided by this section. Provided further, the evidence shall show that the insane spouse is suffering from incurable insanity, and has been confined or examined for three consecutive years next preceding the bringing of the action in an institution for the care and treatment of the mentally disordered or,  if not so confined, has been examined at least three years preceding the institution of the action for divorce and then found to be incurably insane as hereinafter provided. Provided further, that proof of incurable insanity be supported by the testimony of two reputable physicians, one of whom shall be a staff member or the superintendent of the institution where the insane spouse is confined, and one regularly practicing physician in the community wherein such husband and wife reside, who has no connection with the institution in which said insane spouse is confined; and provided further that a sworn statement signed by said staff member or said superintendent of the institution wherein the insane spouse is confined or was examined shall be admissible as evidence of the facts and opinions therein stated as to the mental status of said insane spouse and as to whether or not said insane spouse is suffering from incurable insanity, or the parties according to the laws governing depositions may take the deposition of said staff member or superintendent of the institution wherein the insane spouse is confined; and provided further that incurable insanity may be proved by the testimony of one or more licensed physicians who are members of the staff of one of this State's accredited four‑year medical schools or a state‑supported mental institution, supported by the testimony of one or more other physicians licensed by the State of North Carolina, that each of them examined the allegedly incurable insane spouse at least three years preceding the institution of the action for divorce and then determined that said spouse was suffering from incurable insanity and that one or more of them examined the allegedly insane spouse subsequent to the institution of the action and that in his or their opinion the said allegedly insane spouse was continuously incurably insane throughout the full period of three years prior to the institution of the said action.

In lieu of proof of incurable insanity and confinement for three consecutive years next preceding the bringing of the action in an institution for the care and treatment of the mentally disordered prescribed in the preceding paragraph, it shall be sufficient if the evidence shall show that the allegedly insane spouse was adjudicated to be insane more than three years preceding the institution of the action for divorce, that such insanity has continued without interruption since such adjudication and that such person has not been adjudicated to be sane since such adjudication of insanity; provided, further, proof of incurable insanity existing after the institution of the action for divorce shall be furnished by the testimony of two reputable, regularly practicing physicians, one of whom shall be a psychiatrist.

In lieu of proof of incurable insanity and confinement for three consecutive years next preceding the bringing of the action in an institution for the care and treatment of the mentally disordered, or  the adjudication of insanity, as prescribed in the preceding paragraphs, it shall be sufficient if the evidence shall show that the insane spouse was examined by two or more members of the staff of one of this State's accredited four‑year medical schools, both of whom are medical doctors, at least three years preceding the institution of the action for divorce with a determination at that time by said staff members that said spouse is suffering from incurable insanity, that such insanity has continued without interruption since such determination; provided, further, that sworn statements signed by the staff members of the accredited medical school who examined the insane spouse at least three years preceding the commencement of the action shall be admissible as evidence of the facts and opinions therein stated as to the mental status of said insane spouse as to whether or not said insane spouse was suffering from incurable insanity; provided, further, that proof of incurable insanity under this section existing after the institution of the action for divorce shall be furnished by the testimony of two reputable physicians, one of whom shall be a psychiatrist on the staff of one of the State's accredited four‑year medical schools, and one a physician practicing regularly in the community wherein such insane person resides.

In all decrees granted under this subdivision in actions in which the insane defendant has insufficient income and property to provide for his or her own care and maintenance, the court shall require the plaintiff to provide for the care and maintenance of the insane defendant for the defendant's lifetime, based upon the standards set out in G.S. 50‑16.5(a). The trial court will retain jurisdiction of the parties and the cause, from term to term, for the purpose of making such orders as equity may require to enforce the provisions of the decree requiring plaintiff to furnish the necessary funds for such care and maintenance.

Service of process shall be held upon the regular guardian for said defendant spouse, if any, and if no regular guardian, upon a duly appointed guardian ad litem and also upon the superintendent or physician in charge of the institution wherein the insane spouse is confined. Such guardian or guardian ad litem shall make an investigation of the circumstances and notify the next of kin of the insane spouse or the superintendent of the institution of the action and whenever practical confer with said next of kin before filing appropriate pleadings in behalf of the defendant.

In all actions brought under this subdivision, if the jury finds as a fact that the plaintiff has been guilty of such conduct as has conduced to the unsoundness of mind of the insane defendant, the relief prayed for shall be denied.

The plaintiff or defendant must have resided in this State for six  months next preceding institution of any action under this section. (1945, c. 755; 1949, c. 264, s. 5; 1953, c. 1087; 1955, c. 887, s. 15; 1963, c. 1173; 1971, c. 1173, ss. 1, 2; 1975, c. 771; 1977, c. 501, s. 1; 1983, c. 613, s. 1.)

 

§ 50‑6.  Divorce after separation of one year on application of either party.

Marriages may be dissolved and the parties thereto divorced from the bonds of matrimony on the application of either party, if and when the husband and wife have lived separate and apart for one year, and the plaintiff or defendant in the suit for divorce has resided in the State for a period of six months. A divorce under this section shall not be barred to either party by any defense or plea based upon any provision of G.S. 50‑7, a plea of res judicata, or a plea of recrimination. Notwithstanding the provisions of G.S. 50‑11, or of the common law, a divorce under this section shall not affect the rights of a dependent spouse with respect to alimony which have been asserted in the action or any other pending action.

Whether there has been a resumption of marital relations during the period of separation shall be determined pursuant to G.S. 52‑10.2.  Isolated incidents of sexual intercourse between the parties shall not toll the statutory period required for divorce predicated on separation of one year. (1931, c. 72; 1933, c. 163; 1937, c. 100, ss. 1, 2; 1943, c. 448, s. 3; 1949, c. 264, s. 3; 1965, c. 636, s. 2; 1977, c. 817, s. 1; 1977, 2nd Sess., c. 1190, s. 1; 1979, c. 709, s. 1; 1981, c. 182; 1983, c. 613, s. 2; c. 923, s. 217; 1987, c. 664, s. 2.)

 

§ 50‑7.  Grounds for divorce from bed and board.

The court may grant divorces from bed and board on application of the party injured, made as by law provided, in the following cases if either party:

(1) Abandons his or her family.

(2) Maliciously turns the other out of doors.

(3) By cruel or barbarous treatment endangers the life of the other. In addition, the court may grant the victim of such treatment the remedies available under G.S. 50B‑1, et seq.

(4) Offers such indignities to the person of the other as to render his or her condition intolerable and life burdensome.

(5) Becomes an excessive user of alcohol or drugs so as to render the condition of the other spouse intolerable and the life of that spouse burdensome.

(6) Commits adultery. (1871‑2, c. 193, s. 36; Code, s. 1286; Rev., s. 1562; C.S., s. 1660; 1967, c. 1152, s. 7; 1971, c. 1185, s. 22; 1979, c. 561, s. 5; 1985, c. 574, ss. 1, 2.)

 

§ 50‑8.  Contents of complaint; verification; venue and service in action by nonresident; certain divorces validated.

In all actions for divorce the complaint shall be verified in accordance with the provisions of Rule 11 of the Rules of Civil Procedure and G.S. 1‑148. The plaintiff shall set forth in his or her complaint that the complainant or defendant has been a resident of the State of North Carolina for at least six months next preceding the filing of the complaint, and that the facts set forth therein as grounds for divorce, except in actions for divorce from bed and board, have existed to his or her knowledge for at least six months prior to the filing of the complaint: Provided, however, that if the cause for divorce is one‑year separation, then it shall not be necessary to allege in the complaint that the grounds for divorce have existed for at least six months prior to the filing of the complaint; it being the purpose of this proviso to permit a divorce after such separation of one year without awaiting an additional six months for filing the complaint: Provided, further, that if the complainant is a nonresident of the State action shall be brought in the county of the defendant's residence, and summons served upon the defendant personally or service of summons accepted by the defendant personally in the manner provided in G.S. 1A‑1, Rule 4(j)(1). Notwithstanding any other provision of this section, any suit or action for divorce heretofore instituted by a nonresident of this State in which the defendant was personally served with summons or in which the defendant personally accepted service of the summons and the case was tried and final judgment entered in a court of this State in a county other than the county of the defendant's residence, is hereby validated and declared to be legal and proper, the same as if the suit or action for divorce had been brought in the county of the defendant's residence.

In all divorce actions the complaint shall set forth the name and age of any minor child or children of the marriage, and in the event there are no minor children of the marriage, the complaint shall so state.

In all prior suits and actions for divorce heretofore instituted and tried in the courts of this State where the averments of fact required to be contained in the affidavit heretofore required by this section are or have been alleged and set forth in the complaint in said suits or actions and said complaints have been duly verified as required by Rule 11 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, said allegations so contained in said complaints shall be deemed to be, and are hereby made, a substantial compliance as to the allegations heretofore required by this section to be set forth in any affidavit; and all such suits or actions for divorce, as well as the judgments or decrees issued and entered as a result thereof, are hereby validated and declared to be legal and proper judgments and decrees of divorce.

In all suits and actions for divorce heretofore instituted and tried in this State on and subsequent to the 5th day of April, 1951, wherein the statements, averments, or allegations in the verification to the complaint in said suits or actions are not in accordance with the provisions of Rule 11 of the Rules of Civil Procedure and G.S. 1‑148 or the requirements of this section as to verification of complaint or the allegations, statements or averments in the verification contain the language that the facts set forth in the complaint are true "to the best of affiant's knowledge and belief" instead of the language "that the same is true to his (or her) own knowledge" or similar variation in language, said allegations, statements and averments in said verifications as contained in or attached to said complaint shall be deemed to be, and are hereby made, a substantial compliance as to the allegations, averments or statements required by this section to be set forth in any such verifications; and all such suits or actions for divorce, as well as the judgments or decrees issued and entered as a result thereof, are hereby validated and declared to be legal and proper judgments and decrees of divorce. (1868‑9, c. 93, s. 46; 1869‑70, c. 184; Code, s. 1287; Rev., s. 1563; 1907, c. 1008, s. 1; C.S., s. 1661; 1925, c. 93; 1933, c. 71, ss. 2, 3; 1943, c. 448, s. 1; 1947, c. 165; 1949, c. 264, s. 4; 1951, c. 590; 1955, c. 103; 1965, c. 636, s. 3; c. 751, s. 1; 1967, c. 50; c. 954, s. 3; 1969, c. 803; 1971, c. 415; 1973, c. 39; 1981, c. 599, s. 15; 1997‑433, s. 4.3; 1998‑17, s. 1; 2013‑93, s. 1.)

 

§ 50‑9.  Effect of answer of summons by defendant.

In all cases upon an action for a divorce absolute, where judgment of divorce has heretofore been granted and where the plaintiff has caused to be served upon the defendant in person a legal summons, whether by verified complaint or unverified complaint, and such defendant answered such summons, and where the trial of said action was duly and legally had in all other respects and judgments rendered by a judge of the superior court upon issues answered by a judge and jury, in accordance with law, such judgments are hereby declared to have the same force and effect as any judgment upon an action for divorce otherwise had legally and regularly. (1929, c. 290, s. 1; 1947, c. 393.)

 

§ 50‑10.  Material facts found by judge or jury in divorce or annulment proceedings; when notice of trial not required; procedure same as ordinary civil actions.

(a) Except as provided for in subsection (e) of this section, the material facts in every complaint asking for a divorce or for an annulment shall be deemed to be denied by the defendant, whether the same shall be actually denied by pleading or not, and no judgment shall be given in favor of the plaintiff in any such complaint until such facts have been found by a judge or jury.

(b) Nothing herein shall require notice of trial to be given to a defendant who has not made an appearance in the action.

(c) The determination of whether there is to be a jury trial or a trial before the judge without a jury shall be made in accordance with G.S. 1A‑1, Rules 38 and 39.

(d) The provisions of G.S. 1A‑1, Rule 56, shall be applicable to actions for absolute divorce pursuant to G.S. 50‑6, for the purpose of determining whether any genuine issue of material fact remains for trial by jury, but in the event the court determines that no genuine issue of material fact remains for trial by jury, the court must find the facts as provided herein. The court may enter a judgment of absolute divorce pursuant to the procedures set forth in G.S. 1A‑1, Rule 56, finding all requisite facts from nontestimonial evidence presented by affidavit, verified motion or other verified pleading.

(e) The clerk of superior court, upon request of the plaintiff, may enter judgment in cases in which the plaintiff's only claim against the defendant is for absolute divorce, or absolute divorce and the resumption of a former name, and the defendant has been defaulted for failure to appear, the defendant has answered admitting the allegations of the complaint, or the defendant has filed a waiver of the right to answer, and the defendant is not an infant or incompetent person. (1868‑9, c. 93, s. 47; Code, s. 1288; Rev., s. 1564; C.S., s. 1662; 1963, c. 540, ss. 1, 2; 1965, c. 105; c. 636, s. 4; 1971, c. 17; 1973, cc. 2, 460; 1981, c. 12; 1983 (Reg. Sess., 1984), c. 1037, s. 4; 1985, c. 140; 1991, c. 568, s. 1; 2004‑128, s. 6.)

 

§ 50‑11.  Effects of absolute divorce.

(a) After a judgment of divorce from the bonds of matrimony, all rights arising out of the marriage shall cease and determine except as hereinafter set out, and either party may marry again without restriction arising from the dissolved marriage.

(b) No judgment of divorce shall cause any child in esse or begotten of the body of the wife during coverture to be treated as a child born out of wedlock.

(c) A divorce obtained pursuant to G.S. 50‑5.1 or G.S. 50‑6 shall not affect the rights of either spouse with respect to any action for alimony or postseparation support pending at the time the judgment for divorce is granted. Furthermore, a judgment of absolute divorce shall not impair or destroy the right of a spouse to receive alimony or postseparation support or affect any other rights provided for such spouse under any judgment or decree of a court rendered before or at the time of the judgment of absolute divorce.

(d) A divorce obtained outside the State in an action in which jurisdiction over the person of the dependent spouse was not obtained shall not impair or destroy the right of the dependent spouse to alimony as provided by the laws of this State.

(e) An absolute divorce obtained within this State shall destroy the right of a spouse to equitable distribution under G.S. 50‑20 unless the right is asserted prior to judgment of absolute divorce; except, the defendant may bring an action or file a motion in the cause for equitable distribution within six months from the date of the judgment in such a case if service of process upon the defendant was by publication pursuant to G.S. 1A‑1, Rule 4 and the defendant failed to appear in the action for divorce.

(f) An absolute divorce by a court that lacked personal jurisdiction over the absent spouse or lacked jurisdiction to dispose of the property shall not destroy the right of a spouse to equitable distribution under G.S. 50‑20 if an action or motion in the cause is filed within six months after the judgment of divorce is entered. The validity of such divorce may be attacked in the action for equitable distribution. (1871‑2, c. 193, s. 43; Code, s. 1295; Rev., s. 1569; 1919, c. 204; C.S., s. 1663; 1953, c. 1313; 1955, c. 872, s. 1; 1967, c. 1152, s. 3; 1981, c. 190; c. 815, s. 2; 1987, c. 844, s. 3; 1991, c. 569, s. 2; 1995, c. 319, s. 8; 1998‑217, s. 7(a), (b); 2013‑198, s. 24.)

 

§ 50‑11.1.  Children born of voidable marriage legitimate.

A child born of voidable marriage or a bigamous marriage is legitimate notwithstanding the annulment of the marriage. (1951, c. 893, s. 2.)

 

§ 50‑11.2.  Judgment provisions pertaining to care, custody, tuition and maintenance of minor children.

Where the court has the requisite jurisdiction and upon proper pleadings and proper and due notice to all interested parties the judgment in a divorce action may contain such provisions respecting care, custody, tuition and maintenance of the minor children of the marriage as the court may adjudge; and from time to time such provisions may be modified upon due notice and hearing and a showing of a substantial change in condition; and if there be no minor children, the judgment may so state. The jurisdictional requirements of G.S. 50A‑201, 50A‑203, or 50A‑204 shall apply in regard to a custody decree. (1973, c. 927, s. 1; 1979, c. 110, s. 11; 1999‑223, s. 10.)

 

§ 50‑11.3.  Certain judgments entered prior to January 1, 1981, validated.

Any judgment of divorce which has been entered prior to January 1, 1981, by a court of competent jurisdiction within the State of North Carolina without a conclusion of law that the plaintiff was entitled to an absolute divorce, but which is proper in all other respects, is hereby rendered valid and of full force and effect. (1977, c. 320; 1981, c. 473.)

 

§ 50‑11.4.  Certain judgments of divorce validated.

Any judgment of divorce entered as a result of an action instituted prior to October 1, 1983, upon any grounds abolished by Chapter 613 of the 1983 Session Laws as amended by Section 217(O) of Chapter 923 of the 1983 Session Laws, which is proper in all other respects, is hereby rendered valid and of full force and effect. (1985 (Reg. Sess., 1986), c. 952.)

 

§ 50‑12.  Resumption of maiden or premarriage surname.

(a) Any woman whose marriage is dissolved by a decree of absolute divorce may, upon application to the clerk of court of the county in which she resides or where the divorce was granted setting forth her intention to do so, change her name to any of the following:

(1) Her maiden name; or

(2) The surname of a prior deceased husband; or

(3) The surname of a prior living husband if she has children who have that husband's surname.

(a1) A man whose marriage is dissolved by decree of absolute divorce may, upon application to the clerk of court of the county in which he resides or where the divorce was granted setting forth his intention to do so, change the surname he took upon marriage to his premarriage surname.

(b) The application and fee required by subsection (e) of this section shall be presented to the clerk of the court of the county in which such divorced person resides or where the divorce was granted, and shall set forth the full name of the former spouse of the applicant, the name of the county and state in which the divorce was granted, and the term or session of court at which such divorce was granted, and shall be signed by the woman in her full maiden name, or by the man in his full premarriage surname. The clerks of court of the several counties of the State shall record and index such applications in such manner as shall be required by the Administrative Office of the Courts.

(c) If an applicant, since the divorce, has adopted one of the surnames listed in subsection (a) or (a1) of this section, the applicant's use and adoption of that name is validated.

(d) In the complaint, or counterclaim for divorce filed by any person in this State, the person may petition the court to adopt any surname as provided by this section, and the court is authorized to incorporate in the divorce decree an order authorizing the person to adopt that surname.

(e) For support of the General Court of Justice, a fee in the amount of ten dollars ($10.00) shall be assessed against each person requesting the resumption of maiden or premarriage surname in accordance with this section. Sums collected under this section shall be remitted to the State Treasurer. (1937, c. 53; 1941, c. 9; 1951, c. 780; 1957, c. 394; 1971, c. 1185, s. 23; 1981, c. 494, ss. 1‑4; 1985, c. 488; 1993 (Reg. Sess., 1994), c. 565, s. 1; 2005‑38, s. 1; 2010‑31, s. 15.9(a).)

 

§ 50‑13.  Repealed by Session Laws 1967, c. 1153, s. 1.

 

§ 50‑13.01.  Purposes.

It is the policy of the State of North Carolina to:

(1) Encourage focused, good faith, and child‑centered parenting agreements to reduce needless litigation over child custody matters and to promote the best interest of the child.

(2) Encourage parents to take responsibility for their child by setting the expectation that parenthood will be a significant and ongoing responsibility.

(3) Encourage programs and court practices that reflect the active and ongoing participation of both parents in the child's life and contact with both parents when such is in the child's best interest, regardless of the parents' present marital status, subject to laws regarding abuse, neglect, and dependency.

(4) Encourage both parents to share equitably in the rights and responsibilities of raising their child, even after dissolution of marriage or unwed relationship.

(5) Encourage each parent to establish and maintain a healthy relationship with the other parent when such is determined to be in the best interest of the child, taking into account mental illness, substance abuse, domestic violence, or any other factor the court deems appropriate. (2015‑278, s. 1.)

 

§ 50‑13.1.  Action or proceeding for custody of minor child.

(a) Any parent, relative, or other person, agency, organization or institution claiming the right to custody of a minor child may institute an action or proceeding for the custody of such child, as hereinafter provided. Any person whose actions resulted in a conviction under G.S. 14‑27.21, G.S. 14‑27.22, G.S. 14‑27.23, or G.S. 14‑27.24 and the conception of the minor child may not claim the right to custody of that minor child. Unless a contrary intent is clear, the word "custody" shall be deemed to include custody or visitation or both.

(a1) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, any person instituting an action or proceeding for custody ex parte who has been convicted of a sexually violent offense as defined in G.S. 14‑208.6(5) shall disclose the conviction in the pleadings.

(b) Whenever it appears to the court, from the pleadings or otherwise, that an action involves a contested issue as to the custody or visitation of a minor child, the matter, where there is a program established pursuant to G.S. 7A‑494, shall be set for mediation of the unresolved issues as to custody and visitation before or concurrent with the setting of the matter for hearing unless the court waives mediation pursuant to subsection (c). Issues that arise in motions for modifications as well as in other pleadings shall be set for mediation unless the court waives mediation pursuant to subsection (c) of this section. Custody or visitation issues that arise in motions for contempt or motions to show cause may be set for mediation. Alimony, child support, and other economic issues may not be referred for mediation pursuant to this section. The purposes of mediation under this section include the pursuit of the following goals:

(1) To reduce any acrimony that exists between the parties to a dispute involving custody or visitation of a minor child;

(2) The development of custody and visitation agreements that are in the child's best interest;

(3) To provide the parties with informed choices and, where possible, to give the parties the responsibility for making decisions about child custody and visitation;

(4) To provide a structured, confidential, nonadversarial setting that will facilitate the cooperative resolution of custody and visitation disputes and minimize the stress and anxiety to which the parties, and especially the child, are subjected; and

(5) To reduce the relitigation of custody and visitation disputes.

(c) For good cause, on the motion of either party or on the court's own motion, the court may waive the setting under Article 39A of Chapter 7A of the General Statutes of a contested custody or visitation matter for mediation. Good cause may include, but is not limited to, the following: a showing of undue hardship to a party; an agreement between the parties for voluntary mediation, subject to court approval; allegations of abuse or neglect of the minor child; allegations of alcoholism, drug abuse, or domestic violence between the parents in common; or allegations of severe psychological, psychiatric, or emotional problems. A showing by either party that the party resides more than fifty miles from the court may be considered good cause.

(d) Either party may move to have the mediation proceedings dismissed and the action heard in court due to the mediator's bias, undue familiarity with a party, or other prejudicial ground.

(e) Mediation proceeding shall be held in private and shall be confidential. Except as provided in this Article, all verbal or written communications from either or both parties to the mediator or between the parties in the presence of the mediator made in a proceeding pursuant to this section are absolutely privileged and inadmissible in court. The mediator may assess the needs and interests of the child, and may interview the child or others who are not parties to the proceedings when he or she thinks appropriate.

(f) Neither the mediator nor any party or other person involved in mediation sessions under this section shall be competent to testify to communications made during or in furtherance of such mediation sessions; provided, there is no privilege as to communications made in furtherance of a crime or fraud. Nothing in this subsection shall be construed as permitting an individual to obtain immunity from prosecution for criminal conduct or as excusing an individual from the reporting requirements of Article 3 of Chapter 7B of the General Statutes or G.S. 108A‑102.

(g) Any agreement reached by the parties as a result of the mediation shall be reduced to writing, signed by each party, and submitted to the court as soon as practicable. Unless the court finds good reason not to, it shall incorporate the agreement in a court order and it shall become enforceable as a court order. If some or all of the issues as to custody or visitation are not resolved by mediation, the mediator shall report that fact to the court.

(h) If an agreement that results from mediation and is incorporated into a court order is referred to as a "parenting agreement" or called by some similar name, it shall nevertheless be deemed to be a custody order or child custody determination for purposes of Chapter 50A of the General Statutes, G.S. 14‑320.1, G.S. 110‑139.1, or other places where those terms appear.

(i) If the child whose custody is the subject of an action under this Chapter also is the subject of a juvenile abuse, neglect, or dependency proceeding pursuant to Subchapter 1 of Chapter 7B of the General Statutes, then the custody action under this Chapter is stayed as provided in G.S. 7B‑200. (1967, c. 1153, s. 2; 1989, c. 795, s. 15(b); 1998‑202, s. 13(p); 2004‑128, s. 10; 2005‑320, s. 5; 2005‑423, s. 4; 2007‑462, s. 1; 2011‑411, s 4; 2013‑236, s. 13; 2015‑181, s. 35; 2022‑48, s. 2.)

 

§ 50‑13.2.  Who entitled to custody; terms of custody; visitation rights of grandparents; taking child out of State; consideration of parent's military service.

(a) An order for custody of a minor child entered pursuant to this section shall award the custody of such child to such person, agency, organization or institution as will best promote the interest and welfare of the child. In making the determination, the court shall consider all relevant factors including acts of domestic violence between the parties, the safety of the child, and the safety of either party from domestic violence by the other party. An order for custody must include written findings of fact that reflect the consideration of each of these factors and that support the determination of what is in the best interest of the child. Between the parents, whether natural or adoptive, no presumption shall apply as to who will better promote the interest and welfare of the child. Joint custody to the parents shall be considered upon the request of either parent.

(b) An order for custody of a minor child may grant joint custody to the parents, exclusive custody to one person, agency, organization, or institution, or grant custody to two or more persons, agencies, organizations, or institutions. Any order for custody shall include such terms, including visitation, as will best promote the interest and welfare of the child. If the court finds that domestic violence has occurred, the court shall enter such orders that best protect the children and party who were the victims of domestic violence, in accordance with the provisions of G.S. 50B‑3(a1)(1), (2), and (3). If a party is absent or relocates with or without the children because of an act of domestic violence, the absence or relocation shall not be a factor that weighs against the party in determining custody or visitation. Absent an order of the court to the contrary, each parent shall have equal access to the records of the minor child involving the health, education, and welfare of the child.

(b1) An order for custody of a minor child may provide visitation rights for any grandparent of the child as the court, in its discretion, deems appropriate. As used in this subsection, "grandparent" includes a biological grandparent of a child adopted by a stepparent or a relative of the child where a substantial relationship exists between the grandparent and the child. Under no circumstances shall a biological grandparent of a child adopted by adoptive parents, neither of whom is related to the child and where parental rights of both biological parents have been terminated, be entitled to visitation rights.

(b2) Any order for custody, including visitation, may, as a condition of such custody or visitation, require either or both parents, or any other person seeking custody or visitation, to abstain from consuming alcohol and may require submission to a continuous alcohol monitoring system, of a type approved by the Division of Community Supervision and Reentry of the Department of Adult Correction, to verify compliance with this condition of custody or visitation. Any order pursuant to this subsection shall include an order to the monitoring provider to report any violation of the order to the court and each party to the action. Failure to comply with this condition shall be grounds for civil or criminal contempt.

(c) An order for custody of a minor child may provide for such child to be taken outside of the State, but if the order contemplates the return of the child to this State, the judge may require the person, agency, organization or institution having custody out of this State to give bond or other security conditioned upon the return of the child to this State in accordance with the order of the court.

(d) If, within a reasonable time, one parent fails to consent to adoption pursuant to Chapter 48 of the General Statutes or parental rights have not been terminated, the consent of the other consenting parent shall not be effective in an action for custody of the child.

(e) An order for custody of a minor child may provide for visitation rights by electronic communication. In granting visitation by electronic communication, the court shall consider the following:

(1) Whether electronic communication is in the best interest of the minor child.

(2) Whether equipment to communicate by electronic means is available, accessible, and affordable to the parents of the minor child.

(3) Any other factor the court deems appropriate in determining whether to grant visitation by electronic communication.

The court may set guidelines for electronic communication, including the hours in which the communication may be made, the allocation of costs between the parents in implementing electronic communication with the child, and the furnishing of access information between parents necessary to facilitate electronic communication. Electronic communication with a minor child may be used to supplement visitation with the child. Electronic communication may not be used as a replacement or substitution for custody or visitation. The amount of time electronic communication is used shall not be a factor in calculating child support or be used to justify or support relocation by the custodial parent out of the immediate area or the State. Electronic communication between the minor child and the parent may be subject to supervision as ordered by the court. As used in this subsection, "electronic communication" means contact, other than face‑to‑face contact, facilitated by electronic means, such as by telephone, electronic mail, instant messaging, video teleconferencing, wired or wireless technologies by Internet, or other medium of communication.

(f) In a proceeding for custody of a minor child of a service member, a court may not consider a parent's past deployment or possible future deployment as the only basis in determining the best interest of the child. The court may consider any significant impact on the best interest of the child regarding the parent's past or possible future deployment. (1957, c. 545; 1967, c. 1153, s. 2; 1977, c. 501, s. 2; 1979, c. 967; 1981, c. 735, ss. 1, 2; 1985, c. 575, s. 3; 1987, c. 541, s. 2; c. 776; 1995 (Reg. Sess., 1996), c. 591, s. 5; 2004‑186, s. 17.1; 2009‑314, s. 1; 2012‑146, s. 10; 2013‑27, s. 1; 2015‑278, s. 2; 2017‑186, s. 2(pppp); 2021‑180, s. 19C.9(t).)

 

§ 50‑13.2A.  Action for visitation of an adopted grandchild.

A biological grandparent may institute an action or proceeding for visitation rights with a child adopted by a stepparent or a relative of the child where a substantial relationship exists between the grandparent and the child. Under no circumstances shall a biological grandparent of a child adopted by adoptive parents, neither of whom is related to the child and where parental rights of both biological parents have been terminated, be entitled to visitation rights. A court may award visitation rights if it determines that visitation is in the best interest of the child. An order awarding visitation rights shall contain findings of fact which support the determination by the judge of the best interest of the child. Procedure, venue, and jurisdiction shall be as in an action for custody. (1985, c. 575, s. 2.)

 

§ 50‑13.3.  Enforcement of order for custody.

(a) An order providing for the custody of a minor child is enforceable by proceedings for civil contempt, and its disobedience may be punished by proceedings for criminal contempt, as provided in Chapter 5A, Contempt, of the General Statutes.

Notwithstanding the provisions of G.S. 1‑294, an order pertaining to child custody which has been appealed to the appellate division is enforceable in the trial court by proceedings for civil contempt during the pendency of the appeal. Upon motion of an aggrieved party, the court of the appellate division in which the appeal is pending may stay any order for civil contempt entered for child custody until the appeal is decided, if justice requires.

(b) Any court of this State having jurisdiction to make an award of custody of a minor child in an action or proceeding therefor, shall have the power of injunction in such action or proceeding as provided in Article 37 of Chapter 1 of the General Statutes and G.S. 1A‑1, Rule 65.

(c) Notwithstanding subsections (a) and (b) of this section, a warrant to take physical custody of a child issued by a court pursuant to G.S. 50A‑311 is enforceable throughout this State. (1967, c. 1153, s. 2; 1969, c. 895, s. 16; 1977, c. 711, s. 26; 1983, c. 530, s. 2; 2017‑22, s. 1.)

 

§ 50‑13.4.  Action for support of minor child.

(a) Any parent, or any person, agency, organization or institution having custody of a minor child, or bringing an action or proceeding for the custody of such child, or a minor child by his guardian may institute an action for the support of such child as hereinafter provided.

(b) In the absence of pleading and proof that the circumstances otherwise warrant, the father and mother shall be primarily liable for the support of a minor child. In the absence of pleading and proof that the circumstances otherwise warrant, parents of a minor, unemancipated child who is the custodial or noncustodial parent of a child shall share this primary liability for their grandchild's support with the minor parent, the court determining the proper share, until the minor parent reaches the age of 18 or becomes emancipated. If both the parents of the child requiring support were unemancipated minors at the time of the child's conception, the parents of both minor parents share primary liability for their grandchild's support until both minor parents reach the age of 18 or become emancipated. If only one parent of the child requiring support was an unemancipated minor at the time of the child's conception, the parents of both parents are liable for any arrearages in child support owed by the adult or emancipated parent until the other parent reaches the age of 18 or becomes emancipated. In the absence of pleading and proof that the circumstances otherwise warrant, any other person, agency, organization or institution standing in loco parentis shall be secondarily liable for such support. Such other circumstances may include, but shall not be limited to, the relative ability of all the above‑mentioned parties to provide support or the inability of one or more of them to provide support, and the needs and estate of the child. The judge may enter an order requiring any one or more of the above‑mentioned parties to provide for the support of the child as may be appropriate in the particular case, and if appropriate the court may authorize the application of any separate estate of the child to his support. However, the judge may not order support to be paid by a person who is not the child's parent or an agency, organization or institution standing in loco parentis absent evidence and a finding that such person, agency, organization or institution has voluntarily assumed the obligation of support in writing. The preceding sentence shall not be construed to prevent any court from ordering the support of a child by an agency of the State or county which agency may be responsible under law for such support.

The judge may order responsible parents in a IV‑D establishment case to perform a job search, if the responsible parent is not incapacitated. This includes IV‑D cases in which the responsible parent is a noncustodial mother or a noncustodial father whose affidavit of parentage has been filed with the court or when paternity is not at issue for the child. The court may further order the responsible parent to participate in work activities, as defined in 42 U.S.C. § 607, as the court deems appropriate.

(c) Payments ordered for the support of a minor child shall be in such amount as to meet the reasonable needs of the child for health, education, and maintenance, having due regard to the estates, earnings, conditions, accustomed standard of living of the child and the parties, the child care and homemaker contributions of each party, and other facts of the particular case. Payments ordered for the support of a minor child shall be on a monthly basis, due and payable on the first day of each month. The requirement that orders be established on a monthly basis does not affect the availability of garnishment of disposable earnings based on an obligor's pay period.

The court shall determine the amount of child support payments by applying the presumptive guidelines established pursuant to subsection (c1) of this section. However, upon request of any party, the Court shall hear evidence, and from the evidence, find the facts relating to the reasonable needs of the child for support and the relative ability of each parent to provide support. If, after considering the evidence, the Court finds by the greater weight of the evidence that the application of the guidelines would not meet or would exceed the reasonable needs of the child considering the relative ability of each parent to provide support or would be otherwise unjust or inappropriate the Court may vary from the guidelines. If the court orders an amount other than the amount determined by application of the presumptive guidelines, the court shall make findings of fact as to the criteria that justify varying from the guidelines and the basis for the amount ordered.

Payments ordered for the support of a child shall terminate when the child reaches the age of 18 except:

(1) If the child is otherwise emancipated, payments shall terminate at that time;

(2) If the child is still in primary or secondary school when the child reaches age 18, support payments shall continue until the child graduates, otherwise ceases to attend school on a regular basis, fails to make satisfactory academic progress towards graduation, or reaches age 20, whichever comes first, unless the court in its discretion orders that payments cease at age 18 or prior to high school graduation.

(3) (See Editor's note for applicability) If the child is enrolled in a cooperative innovative high school program authorized under Part 9 of Article 16 of Chapter 115C of the General Statutes, then payments shall terminate when the child completes his or her fourth year of enrollment or when the child reaches the age of 18, whichever occurs later.

In the case of graduation, or attaining age 20, payments shall terminate without order by the court, subject to the right of the party receiving support to show, upon motion and with notice to the opposing party, that the child has not graduated or attained the age of 20.

If an arrearage for child support or fees due exists at the time that a child support obligation terminates, payments shall continue in the same total amount that was due under the terms of the previous court order or income withholding in effect at the time of the support obligation. The total amount of these payments is to be applied to the arrearage until all arrearages and fees are satisfied or until further order of the court.

(c1) Effective July 1, 1990, the Conference of Chief District Judges shall prescribe uniform statewide presumptive guidelines for the computation of child support obligations, including retroactive support obligations, of each parent as provided in Chapter 50 or elsewhere in the General Statutes and shall develop criteria for determining when, in a particular case, application of the guidelines would be unjust or inappropriate. The purpose of the guidelines and criteria shall be to ensure that payments ordered for the support of a minor child are in such amount as to meet the reasonable needs of the child for health, education, and maintenance, having due regard to the estates, earnings, conditions, accustomed standard of living of the child and the parties, the child care and homemaker contributions of each party, and other facts of the particular case. The guidelines shall include a procedure for setting child support, if any, in a joint or shared custody arrangement which shall reflect the other statutory requirements herein.

Periodically, but at least once every four years, the Conference of Chief District Judges shall review the guidelines to determine whether their application results in appropriate child support award amounts. The Conference may modify the guidelines accordingly. The Conference shall give the Department of Health and Human Services, the Administrative Office of the Courts, and the general public an opportunity to provide the Conference with information relevant to the development and review of the guidelines. Any modifications of the guidelines or criteria shall be reported to the General Assembly by the Administrative Office of the Courts before they become effective by delivering copies to the President Pro Tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives. The guidelines, when adopted or modified, shall be provided to the Department of Health and Human Services and the Administrative Office of the Courts, which shall disseminate them to the public through local IV‑D offices, clerks of court, and the media.

(d) In non‑IV‑D cases, payments for the support of a minor child shall be ordered to be paid to the person having custody of the child or any other proper person, agency, organization or institution, or to the State Child Support Collection and Disbursement Unit, for the benefit of the child. In IV‑D cases, payments for the support of a minor child shall be ordered to be paid to the State Child Support Collection and Disbursement Unit for the benefit of the child.

(d1) For child support orders initially entered on or after January 1, 1994, the immediate income withholding provisions of G.S. 110‑136.5(c1) shall apply.

(e) Payment for the support of a minor child shall be paid by lump sum payment, periodic payments, or by transfer of title or possession of personal property of any interest therein, or a security interest in or possession of real property, as the court may order. The court may order the transfer of title to real property solely owned by the obligor in payment of arrearages of child support so long as the net value of the interest in the property being transferred does not exceed the amount of the arrearage being satisfied. In every case in which payment for the support of a minor child is ordered and alimony or postseparation support is also ordered, the order shall separately state and identify each allowance.

(e1) In IV‑D cases, the order for child support shall provide that the clerk shall transfer the case to another jurisdiction in this State if the IV‑D agency requests the transfer on the basis that the obligor, the custodian of the child, and the child do not reside in the jurisdiction in which the order was issued. The IV‑D agency shall provide notice of the transfer to the obligor by delivery of written notice in accordance with the notice requirements of Chapter 1A‑1, Rule 5(b) of the Rules of Civil Procedure. The clerk shall transfer the case to the jurisdiction requested by the IV‑D agency, which shall be a jurisdiction in which the obligor, the custodian of the child, or the child resides. Nothing in this subsection shall be construed to prevent a party from contesting the transfer.

(f) Remedies for enforcement of support of minor children shall be available as follows:

(1) The court may require the person ordered to make payments for the support of a minor child to secure the payments by means of a bond, mortgage or deed of trust, or any other means ordinarily used to secure an obligation to pay money or transfer property, or by requiring the execution of an assignment of wages, salary or other income due or to become due.

(2) If the court requires the transfer of real or personal property or an interest therein as provided in subsection (e) of this section as a part of an order for payment of support for a minor child, or for the securing thereof, the court may also enter an order which shall transfer title as provided in G.S. 1A‑1, Rule 70 and G.S. 1‑228.

(3) The remedy of arrest and bail, as provided in Article 34 of Chapter 1 of the General Statutes, shall be available in actions for child‑support payments as in other cases.

(4) The remedies of attachment and garnishment, as provided in Article 35 of Chapter 1 of the General Statutes, shall be available in an action for child‑support payments as in other cases, and for such purposes the child or person bringing an action for child support shall be deemed a creditor of the defendant. Additionally, in accordance with the provisions of G.S. 110‑136, a continuing wage garnishment proceeding for wages due or to become due may be instituted by motion in the original child support proceeding or by independent action through the filing of a petition.

(5) The remedy of injunction, as provided in Article 37 of Chapter 1 of the General Statutes and G.S. 1A‑1, Rule 65, shall be available in actions for child support as in other cases.

(6) Receivers, as provided in Article 38 of Chapter 1 of the General Statutes, may be appointed in actions for child support as in other cases.

(7) A minor child or other person for whose benefit an order for the payment of child support has been entered shall be a creditor within the meaning of Article 3A of Chapter 39 of the General Statutes pertaining to voidable transactions.

(8) Except as provided in Article 15 of Chapter 44 of the General Statutes, a judgment for child support shall not be a lien against real property unless the judgment expressly so provides, sets out the amount of the lien in a sum certain, and adequately describes the real property affected; but past due periodic payments may by motion in the cause or by a separate action be reduced to judgment which shall be a lien as other judgments and may include provisions for periodic payments.

(9) An order for the periodic payments of child support or a child support judgment that provides for periodic payments is enforceable by proceedings for civil contempt, and disobedience may be punished by proceedings for criminal contempt, as provided in Chapter 5A of the General Statutes.

Notwithstanding the provisions of G.S. 1‑294, an order for the payment of child support which has been appealed to the appellate division is enforceable in the trial court by proceedings for civil contempt during the pendency of the appeal. Upon motion of an aggrieved party, the court of the appellate division in which the appeal is pending may stay any order for civil contempt entered for child support until the appeal is decided, if justice requires.

(10) The remedies provided by Chapter 1 of the General Statutes, Article 28, Execution; Article 29B, Execution Sales; and Article 31, Supplemental Proceedings, shall be available for the enforcement of judgments for child support as in other cases, but amounts so payable shall not constitute a debt as to which property is exempt from execution as provided in Article 16 of Chapter 1C of the General Statutes.

(11) The specific enumeration of remedies in this section shall not constitute a bar to remedies otherwise available.

(g) An individual who brings an action or motion in the cause for the support of a minor child, and the individual who defends the action, shall provide to the clerk of the court in which the action is brought or the order is issued, the individual's social security number.

(h) Child support orders initially entered or modified on and after October 1, 1998, shall contain the name of each of the parties, the date of birth of each party, and the court docket number. The Administrative Office of the Courts shall transmit to the Department of Health and Human Services, Child Support Enforcement Program, on a timely basis, the information required to be included on orders under this subsection and the social security number of each party as required under subsection (g) of this section. (1967, c. 1153, s. 2; 1969, c. 895, s. 17; 1975, c. 814; 1977, c. 711, s. 26; 1979, c. 386, s. 10; 1981, c. 472; c. 613, ss. 1, 3; 1983, c. 54; c. 530, s. 1; 1985, c. 689, s. 17; 1985 (Reg. Sess., 1986), c. 1016; 1989, c. 529, ss. 1, 2; 1989 (Reg. Sess., 1990), c. 1067, s. 2; 1993, c. 335, s. 1; c. 517, s. 5; 1995, c. 319, s. 9; c. 518, s. 1; 1997‑433, ss. 2.1(a), 2.2, 4.4, 7.1; 1997‑443, ss. 11A.118(a), 11A.122; 1998‑17, s. 1; 1998‑176, s. 1; 1999‑293, ss. 3, 4; 1999‑456, s. 13; 2001‑237, s. 1; 2003‑288, s. 1; 2008‑12, s. 1; 2012‑20, s. 2; 2014‑77, s. 8; 2014‑115, s. 37; 2015‑23, s. 2.)

 

§ 50‑13.5.  Procedure in actions for custody or support of minor children.

(a) Procedure. – The procedure in actions for custody and support of minor children shall be as in civil actions, except as provided in this section and in G.S. 50‑19. In this G.S. 50‑13.5 the words "custody and support" shall be deemed to include custody or support, or both.

(b) Type of Action. – An action brought under the provisions of this section may be maintained as follows:

(1) As a civil action.

(2) Repealed by Session Laws 1979, c. 110, s. 12.

(3) Joined with an action for annulment, or an action for divorce, either absolute or from bed and board, or an action for alimony without divorce.

(4) As a cross action in an action for annulment, or an action for divorce, either absolute or from bed and board, or an action for alimony without divorce.

(5) By motion in the cause in an action for annulment, or an action for divorce, either absolute or from bed and board, or an action for alimony without divorce.

(6) Upon the court's own motion in an action for annulment, or an action for divorce, either absolute or from bed and board, or an action for alimony without divorce.

(7) In any of the foregoing the judge may issue an order requiring that the body of the minor child be brought before him.

(c) Jurisdiction in Actions or Proceedings for Child Support and Child Custody. –

(1) The jurisdiction of the courts of this State to enter orders providing for the support of a minor child shall be as in actions or proceedings for the payment of money or the transfer of property.

(2) The courts of this State shall have jurisdiction to enter orders providing for the custody of a minor child under the provisions of G.S. 50A‑201, 50A‑202, and 50A‑204.

(3) to (6) Repealed by Session Laws 1979, c. 110, s. 12.

(d) Service of Process; Notice; Interlocutory Orders. –

(1) Service of process in civil actions for the custody of minor children shall be as in other civil actions. Motions for support of a minor child in a pending action may be made on 10 days notice to the other parties and compliance with G.S. 50‑13.5(e). Motions for custody of a minor child in a pending action may be made on 10 days notice to the other parties and after compliance with G.S. 50A‑205.

(2) If the circumstances of the case render it appropriate, upon gaining jurisdiction of the minor child the court may enter orders for the temporary custody and support of the child, pending the service of process or notice as herein provided.

(3) A temporary order for custody which changes the living arrangements of a child or changes custody shall not be entered ex parte and prior to service of process or notice, unless the court finds that the child is exposed to a substantial risk of bodily injury or sexual abuse or that there is a substantial risk that the child may be abducted or removed from the State of North Carolina for the purpose of evading the jurisdiction of North Carolina courts. A temporary custody order that requires a law enforcement officer to take physical custody of a minor child shall be accompanied by a warrant to take physical custody of a minor child as set forth in G.S. 50A‑311.

(e) Notice to Additional Persons in Support Actions and Proceedings; Intervention. –

(1) The parents of the minor child whose addresses are reasonably ascertainable; any person, agency, organization or institution having actual care, control, or custody of a minor child; and any person, agency, organization or institution required by court order to provide for the support of a minor child, either in whole or in part, not named as parties and served with process in an action or proceeding for the support of such child, shall be given notice by the party raising the issue of support.

(2) The notice herein required shall be in the manner provided by the Rules of Civil Procedure for the service of notices in actions. Such notice shall advise the person to be notified of the name of the child, the names of the parties to the action or proceeding, the court in which the action or proceeding was instituted, and the date thereof.

(3) In the discretion of the court, failure of such service of notice shall not affect the validity of any order or judgment entered in such action or proceeding.

(4) Any person required to be given notice as herein provided may intervene in an action or proceeding for support of a minor child by filing in apt time notice of appearance or other appropriate pleadings.

(f) Venue. – An action or proceeding in the courts of this State for custody and support of a minor child may be maintained in the county where the child resides or is physically present or in a county where a parent resides, except as hereinafter provided. If an action for annulment, for divorce, either absolute or from bed and board, or for alimony without divorce has been previously instituted in this State, until there has been a final judgment in such case, any action or proceeding for custody and support of the minor children of the marriage shall be joined with such action or be by motion in the cause in such action. If an action or proceeding for the custody and support of a minor child has been instituted and an action for annulment or for divorce, either absolute or from bed and board, or for alimony without divorce is subsequently instituted in the same or another county, the court having jurisdiction of the prior action or proceeding may, in its discretion direct that the action or proceeding for custody and support of a minor child be consolidated with such subsequent action, and in the event consolidation is ordered, shall determine in which court such consolidated action or proceeding shall be heard.

(g) Custody and Support Irrespective of Parents' Rights Inter Partes. – Orders for custody and support of minor children may be entered when the matter is before the court as provided by this section, irrespective of the rights of the wife and the husband as between themselves in an action for annulment or an action for divorce, either absolute or from bed and board, or an action for alimony without divorce.

(h) Court Having Jurisdiction. – When a district court having jurisdiction of the matter shall have been established, actions or proceedings for custody and support of minor children shall be heard without a jury by the judge of such district court, and may be heard at any time.

(i) District Court; Denial of Parental Visitation Right; Written Finding of Fact. – In any case in which an award of child custody is made in a district court, the trial judge, prior to denying a parent the right of reasonable visitation, shall make a written finding of fact that the parent being denied visitation rights is an unfit person to visit the child or that such visitation rights are not in the best interest of the child.

(j) Custody and Visitation Rights of Grandparents. – In any action in which the custody of a minor child has been determined, upon a motion in the cause and a showing of changed circumstances pursuant to G.S. 50‑13.7, the grandparents of the child are entitled to such custody or visitation rights as the court, in its discretion, deems appropriate. As used in this subsection, "grandparent" includes a biological grandparent of a child adopted by a stepparent or a relative of the child where a substantial relationship exists between the grandparent and the child. Under no circumstances shall a biological grandparent of a child adopted by adoptive parents, neither of whom is related to the child and where parental rights of both biological parents have been terminated, be entitled to visitation rights. (1858‑9, c. 53, s. 2; 1871‑2, c. 193, ss. 39, 46; Code, ss. 1292, 1296, 1570, 1662; Rev., ss. 1567, 1570, 1854; 1919, c. 24; C.S., ss. 1664, 1667, 2242; 1921, c. 13; 1923, c. 52; 1939, c. 115; 1941, c. 120; 1943, c. 194; 1949, c. 1010; 1951, c. 893, s. 3; 1953, cc. 813, 925; 1955, cc. 814, 1189; 1957, c. 545; 1965, c. 310, s. 2; 1967, c. 1153, s. 2; 1971, c. 1185, s. 24; 1973, c. 751; 1979, c. 110, s. 12; c. 563; c. 709, s. 3; 1981, c. 735, s. 3; 1983, c. 587; 1985, c. 575, s. 4; 1987 (Reg. Sess., 1988), c. 893, s. 3.1; 1999‑223, ss. 11, 12; 2017‑22, s. 2.)

 

§ 50‑13.6.  Counsel fees in actions for custody and support of minor children.

In an action or proceeding for the custody or support, or both, of a minor child, including a motion in the cause for the modification or revocation of an existing order for custody or support, or both, the court may in its discretion order payment of reasonable attorney's fees to an interested party acting in good faith who has insufficient means to defray the expense of the suit. Before ordering payment of a fee in a support action, the court must find as a fact that the party ordered to furnish support has refused to provide support which is adequate under the circumstances existing at the time of the institution of the action or proceeding; provided however, should the court find as a fact that the supporting party has initiated a frivolous action or proceeding the court may order payment of reasonable attorney's fees to an interested party as deemed appropriate under the circumstances. (1967, c. 1153, s. 2; 1973, c. 323.)

 

§ 50‑13.7.  Modification of order for child support or custody.

(a) An order of a court of this State for support of a minor child may be modified or vacated at any time, upon motion in the cause and a showing of changed circumstances by either party or anyone interested subject to the limitations of G.S. 50‑13.10. Subject to G.S. 50A‑201, 50A‑202, and 50A‑204, an order of a court of this State for custody of a minor child may be modified or vacated at any time, upon motion in the cause and a showing of changed circumstances by either party or anyone interested.

(b) When an order for support of a minor child has been entered by a court of another state, a court of this State may, upon gaining jurisdiction, and upon a showing of changed circumstances, enter a new order for support that modifies or supersedes the order for support, subject to the limitations of G.S. 50‑13.10. Subject to G.S. 50A‑201, 50A‑202, and 50A‑204, when an order for custody of a minor child has been entered by a court of another state, a court of this State may, upon gaining jurisdiction, and a showing of changed circumstances, enter a new order for custody that modifies or supersedes the order for custody. (1858‑9, c. 53; 1868‑9, c. 116, s. 36; 1871‑2, c. 193, s. 46; Code, ss. 1296, 1570, 1661; Rev., ss. 1570, 1853; C.S., ss. 1664, 2241; 1929, c. 270, s. 1; 1939, c. 115; 1941, c. 120; 1943, c. 194; 1949, c. 1010; 1953, c. 813; 1957, c. 545; 1965, c. 310, s. 2; 1967, c. 1153, s. 2; 1979, c. 110, s. 13; 1981, c. 682, s. 12; 1987, c. 739, s. 3; 1999‑223, s. 13; 2007‑175, s. 1; 2021‑88, s. 6.)

 

§ 50‑13.7A: Repealed by Session Laws 2013‑27, s. 2, effective October 1, 2013.

 

§ 50‑13.8.  Custody of persons incapable of self‑support upon reaching majority.

For the purposes of custody, the rights of a person who is mentally or physically incapable of self‑support upon reaching his majority shall be the same as a minor child for so long as he remains mentally or physically incapable of self‑support. (1967, c. 1153, s. 2; 1971, c. 218, s. 3; 1973, c. 476, s. 133; 1979, c. 838, s. 29; 1989, c. 210.)

 

§ 50‑13.9.  Procedure to insure payment of child support.

(a) Upon its own motion or upon motion of either party, the court may order at any time that support payments be made to the State Child Support Collection and Disbursement Unit for remittance to the party entitled to receive the payments. For child support orders initially entered on or after January 1, 1994, the immediate income withholding provisions of G.S. 110‑136.5(c1) apply.

(b) After entry of an order by the court under subsection (a) of this section, the State Child Support Collection and Disbursement Unit shall transmit child support payments that are made to it to the custodial parent or other party entitled to receive them, unless a court order requires otherwise.

(b1) In a IV‑D case:

(1) The designated child support enforcement agency shall have the sole responsibility and authority for monitoring the obligor's compliance with all child support orders in the case and for initiating any enforcement procedures that it considers appropriate.

(2) The clerk of court shall maintain all official records in the case.

(3) The designated child support enforcement agency shall maintain any other records needed to monitor the obligor's compliance with or to enforce the child support orders in the case, including records showing the amount of each payment of child support received from or on behalf of the obligor, along with the dates on which each payment was received. In any action establishing, enforcing, or modifying a child support order, the payment records maintained by the designated child support agency shall be admissible evidence, and the court shall permit the designated representative to authenticate those records.

(b2) In a non‑IV‑D case:

(1) Repealed by Session Laws 2005, ch. 389, s. 1.

(2) The clerk of court shall maintain all official records and all case data concerning child support matters previously enforced by the clerk of court.

(3) Repealed by Session Laws 2005, ch. 389, s. 1.

(c) In a IV‑D case, the parties affected by the order shall inform the designated child support enforcement agency of any change of address or other condition that may affect the administration of the order. The court may provide in the order that a party failing to inform the court or, as appropriate, the designated child support enforcement agency, of a change of address within a reasonable period of time may be held in civil contempt.

(d) Upon affidavit of an obligee, the clerk or a district court judge may order the obligor to appear and show cause why the obligor should not be subjected to income withholding or adjudged in contempt of court, or both. The order shall require the obligor to appear and show cause why the obligor should not be subjected to income withholding or adjudged in contempt of court, or both, and shall order the obligor to bring to the hearing records and information relating to the obligor's employment, the obligor's licensing privileges, and the amount and sources of the obligor's disposable income. The order shall state:

(1) That the obligor is under a court order to provide child support, the name of each child for whose benefit support is due, and information sufficient to identify the order;

(2) That the obligor is delinquent and the amount of overdue support;

(2a) That the court may order the revocation of some or all of the obligor's licensing privileges if the obligor is delinquent in an amount equal to the support due for one month;

(3) That the court may order income withholding if the obligor is delinquent in an amount equal to the support due for one month;

(4) That income withholding, if implemented, will apply to the obligor's current payors and all subsequent payors and will be continued until terminated pursuant to G.S. 110‑136.10;

(5) That failure to bring to the hearing records and information relating to his employment and the amount and sources of his disposable income will be grounds for contempt;

(6) That if income withholding is not an available or appropriate remedy, the court may determine whether the obligor is in contempt or whether any other enforcement remedy is appropriate.

The order may be signed by the clerk or a district court judge, and shall be served on the obligor pursuant to G.S. 1A‑1, Rule 4, Rules of Civil Procedure. On motion of the person to whom support is owed in a non‑IV‑D case, with the approval of the district court judge, if the district court judge finds it is in the best interest of the child, no order shall be issued.

(e) Repealed by Session Laws 2005, ch. 389, s. 1.

(f) Repealed by Session Laws 2005, ch. 389, s. 1.

(g) Nothing in this section shall preclude the independent initiation by a party of proceedings for civil contempt or for income withholding. ( 1983, c. 677, s. 1; 1985 (Reg. Sess., 1986), c. 949, ss. 3‑6; 1989, c. 479; 1993, c. 517, s. 6; c. 553, s. 67.1; 1995, c. 444, s. 1; c. 538, s. 1.2; 1997‑443, s. 11A.118(a); 1999‑293, ss. 11‑14; 2001‑237, s. 7; 2005‑389, s. 1; 2006‑264, s. 97.)

 

§ 50‑13.10.  Past due child support vested; not subject to retroactive modification; entitled to full faith and credit.

(a) Each past due child support payment is vested when it accrues and may not thereafter be vacated, reduced, or otherwise modified in any way for any reason, in this State or any other state, except that a child support obligation may be modified as otherwise provided by law, and a vested past due payment is to that extent subject to divestment, if, but only if, a written motion is filed, and due notice is given to all parties either:

(1) Before the payment is due or

(2) If the moving party is precluded by physical disability, mental incapacity, indigency, misrepresentation of another party, or other compelling reason from filing a motion before the payment is due, then promptly after the moving party is no longer so precluded.

(b) A past due child support payment which is vested pursuant to G.S. 50‑13.10(a) is entitled, as a judgment, to full faith and credit in this State and any other state, with the full force, effect, and attributes of a judgment of this State, except that no arrearage shall be entered on the judgment docket of the clerk of superior court or become a lien on real estate, nor shall execution issue thereon, except as provided in G.S. 50‑13.4(f)(8) and (10).

(c) As used in this section, "child support payment" includes all payments required by court or administrative order in civil actions and expedited process proceedings under this Chapter, by court order in proceedings under Chapter 49 of the General Statutes, and by agreements entered into and approved by the court under G.S. 110‑132 or G.S. 110‑133.

(d) For purposes of this section, a child support payment or the relevant portion thereof, is not past due, and no arrearage accrues:

(1) From and after the date of the death of the minor child for whose support the payment, or relevant portion, is made;

(2) From and after the date of the death of the supporting party;

(3) During any period when the child is living with the supporting party pursuant to a valid court order or to an express or implied written or oral agreement transferring primary custody to the supporting party;

(4) During any period when the supporting party is incarcerated, is not on work release, and has no resources with which to make the payment.

(e) When a child support payment that is to be made to the State Child Support Collection and Disbursement Unit is not received by the Unit when due, the payment is not a past due child support payment for purposes of this section, and no arrearage accrues, if the payment is actually made to and received on time by the party entitled to receive it and that receipt is evidenced by a canceled check, money order, or contemporaneously executed and dated written receipt. Nothing in this section shall affect the duties of the clerks or the IV‑D agency under this Chapter or Chapter 110 of the General Statutes with respect to payments not received by the Unit on time, but the court, in any action to enforce such a payment, may enter an order directing the clerk or the IV‑D agency to enter the payment on the clerk's or IV‑D agency's records as having been made on time, if the court finds that the payment was in fact received by the party entitled to receive it as provided in this subsection. (1987, c. 739, s. 4; 1999‑293, s. 15.)

 

§ 50‑13.11.  Orders and agreements regarding medical support and health insurance coverage for minor children.

(a) The court may order a parent of a minor child or other responsible party to provide medical support for the child, or the parties may enter into a written agreement regarding medical support for the child. An order or agreement for medical support for the child may require one or both parties to pay the medical, hospital, dental, or other health care related expenses.

(a1) The court shall order the parent of a minor child or other responsible party to maintain health insurance for the benefit of the child when health insurance is available at a reasonable cost. If health insurance is not presently available at a reasonable cost, the court shall order the parent of a minor child or other responsible party to maintain health insurance for the benefit of the child when health insurance becomes available at a reasonable cost. As used in this subsection, health insurance for the benefit of the child is considered reasonable in cost if the coverage for the child is available at a cost to the parent that does not exceed five percent (5%) of the parent's gross income. In applying this standard, the cost is the cost of (i) adding the child to the parent's existing coverage, (ii) child‑only coverage, or (iii) if new coverage must be obtained, the difference between the cost of self‑only and family coverage. The court may require one or both parties to maintain dental insurance.

(b) The party ordered or under agreement to provide health insurance shall provide written notice of any change in the applicable insurance coverage to the other party.

(c) The employer or insurer of the party required to provide health, hospital, and dental insurance shall release to the other party, upon written request, any information on a minor child's insurance coverage that the employer or insurer may release to the party required to provide health, hospital, and dental insurance.

(d) When a court order or agreement for health insurance is in effect, the signature of either party shall be valid authorization to the insurer to process an insurance claim on behalf of a minor child.

(e) If the party who is required to provide health insurance fails to maintain the insurance coverage for the minor child, the party shall be liable for any health, hospital, or dental expenses incurred from the date of the court order or agreement that would have been covered by insurance if it had been in force.

(f) When a noncustodial parent ordered to provide health insurance changes employment and health insurance coverage is available through the new employer, the obligee shall notify the new employer of the noncustodial parent's obligation to provide health insurance for the child. Upon receipt of notice from the obligee, the new employer shall enroll the child in the employer's health insurance plan. (1989 (Reg. Sess., 1990), c. 1067, s. 1; 1991, c. 419, s. 2; c. 761, s. 42; 1997‑433, s. 3.1; 1998‑17, s. 1; 2003‑288, s. 3.2; 2015‑220, s. 1.)

 

§ 50‑13.12.  Forfeiture of licensing privileges for failure to pay child support or for failure to comply with subpoena issued pursuant to child support or paternity establishment proceedings.

(a) As used in this section, the term:

(1) "Licensing board" means a department, division, agency, officer, board, or other unit of state government that issues hunting, fishing, trapping, drivers, or occupational licenses or licensing privileges.

(2) "Licensing privilege" means the privilege of an individual to be authorized to engage in an activity as evidenced by hunting, fishing, or trapping licenses, regular and commercial drivers licenses, and occupational, professional, and business licenses.

(3) "Obligee" means the individual or agency to whom a duty of support is owed or the individual's legal representative.

(4) "Obligor" means the individual who owes a duty to make child support payments under a court order.

(5) "Occupational license" means a license, certificate, permit, registration, or any other authorization issued by a licensing board that allows an obligor to engage in an occupation or profession.

(b) Upon a finding by the district court judge that the obligor is willfully delinquent in child support payments equal to at least one month's child support, or upon a finding that a person has willfully failed to comply with a subpoena issued pursuant to a child support or paternity establishment proceeding, and upon findings as to any specific licensing privileges held by the obligor or held by the person subject to the subpoena, the court may revoke some or all of such privileges until the obligor shall have paid the delinquent amount in full, or, as applicable, until the person subject to the subpoena has complied with the subpoena. The court may stay any such revocation pertaining to the obligor upon conditions requiring the obligor to make full payment of the delinquency over time. Any such stay shall further be conditioned upon the obligor's maintenance of current child support. The court may stay the revocation pertaining to the person subject to the subpoena upon a finding that the person has complied with or is no longer subject to the subpoena. Upon an order revoking such privileges of an obligor that does not stay the revocation, the clerk of superior court shall notify the appropriate licensing board that the obligor is delinquent in child support payments and that the obligor's licensing privileges are revoked until such time as the licensing board receives proof of certification by the clerk that the obligor is no longer delinquent in child support payments. Upon an order revoking such privileges of a person subject to the subpoena that does not stay the revocation, the clerk of superior court shall notify the appropriate licensing board that the person has failed to comply with the subpoena issued pursuant to a child support or paternity establishment proceeding and that the person's licensing privileges are revoked until such time as the licensing board receives proof of certification by the clerk that the person is in compliance with or no longer subject to the subpoena.

(c) An obligor may file a request with the clerk of superior court for certification that the obligor is no longer delinquent in child support payments upon submission of proof satisfactory to the clerk that the obligor has paid the delinquent amount in full. A person whose licensing privileges have been revoked under subsection (b) of this section because of a willful failure to comply with a subpoena may file a request with the clerk of superior court for certification that the person has met the requirements of or is no longer subject to the subpoena. The clerk shall provide a form to be used for a request for certification. If the clerk finds that the obligor has met the requirements for reinstatement under this subsection, then the clerk shall certify that the obligor is no longer delinquent and shall provide a copy of the certification to the obligor. Upon request of the obligor, the clerk shall mail a copy of the certification to the appropriate licensing board. If the clerk finds that the person whose licensing privileges have been revoked under subsection (b) of this section for failure to comply with a subpoena has complied with or is no longer subject to the subpoena, then the clerk shall certify that the person has met the requirements of or is no longer subject to the subpoena and shall provide a copy of the certification to the person. Upon request of the person, the clerk shall mail a copy of the certification to the appropriate licensing board.

(d) If licensing privileges are revoked under this section, the obligor may petition the district court for a reinstatement of such privileges. The court may order the privileges reinstated conditioned upon full payment of the delinquency over time. Any order allowing license reinstatement shall additionally require the obligor's maintenance of current child support. If the licensing privileges of a person other than the obligor are revoked under this section for failure to comply with a subpoena, the person may petition the district court for reinstatement of the privileges. The court may order the privileges reinstated if the person has complied with or is no longer subject to the subpoena that was the basis for revocation. Upon reinstatement under this subsection, the clerk of superior court shall certify that the obligor is no longer delinquent and provide a copy of the certification to the obligor. Upon request of the obligor, the clerk shall mail a copy of the certification to the appropriate licensing board. Upon reinstatement of the person whose licensing privileges were revoked based on failure to comply with a subpoena, the clerk of superior court shall certify that the person has complied with or is no longer subject to the subpoena. Upon request of the person whose licensing privileges are reinstated, the clerk shall mail a copy of the certification to the appropriate licensing board.

(e) An obligor or other person whose licensing privileges are reinstated under this section may provide a copy of the certification set forth in either subsection (c) or (d) to each licensing agency to which the obligor or other person applies for reinstatement of licensing privileges. Upon request of the obligor or other person, the clerk shall mail a copy of the certification to the appropriate licensing board. Upon receipt of a copy of the certification, the licensing board shall reinstate the license.

(f) Upon receipt of notification by the clerk that an obligor's or other person's licensing privileges are revoked pursuant to this section, the board shall note the revocation on its records and take all necessary steps to implement and enforce the revocation. These steps shall not include the board's independent revocation process pursuant to Chapter 150B of the General Statutes, the Administrative Procedure Act, which process is replaced by the court process prescribed by this section. The revocation pertaining to an obligor shall remain in full force and effect until the board receives certification under this section that the obligor is no longer delinquent in child support payments. The revocation pertaining to the person whose licensing privileges were revoked on the basis of failure to comply with a subpoena shall remain in full force and effect until the board receives certification of reinstatement under subsection (d) of this section. (1995, c. 538, ss. 1, 1.1; 1997‑433, s. 5.3; 1998‑17, s. 1.)

 

§ 50‑13.13.  Motion or claim for relief from child support order based on finding of nonpaternity.

(a) Notwithstanding G.S. 1A‑1, Rule 60 of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure, or any other provision of law, an individual who, as the father of a child, is required to pay child support under an order that was entered by a North Carolina court pursuant to Chapter 49, 50, 52C, or 110 of the General Statutes, or under an agreement between the parties pursuant to G.S. 52‑10.1 or otherwise, and that is subject to modification by a North Carolina court under applicable law may file a motion or claim seeking relief from a child support order as provided in this section.

(b) A motion or claim for relief under this section shall be filed as a motion or claim in the cause in the pending child support action, or as an independent civil action, and shall be filed within one year of the date the moving party knew or reasonably should have known that he was not the father of the child. The motion or claim shall be verified by the moving party and shall state all of the following:

(1) The basis, with particularity, on which the moving party believes that he is not the child's father.

(2) The moving party has not acknowledged paternity of the child or acknowledged paternity without knowing that he was not the child's biological father.

(3) The moving party has not adopted the child, has not legitimated the child pursuant to G.S. 49‑10, 49‑12, or 49‑12.1, or is not the child's legal father pursuant to G.S. 49A‑1.

(4) The moving party did not act to prevent the child's biological father from asserting his paternal rights regarding the child.

(c) The court may appoint a guardian ad litem pursuant to G.S. 1A‑1, Rule 17, to represent the interest of the child in connection with a proceeding under this section.

(d) Notwithstanding G.S. 8‑50.1(b1), the court shall, upon motion or claim of a party in a proceeding under this section, order the moving party, the child's mother, and the child to submit to genetic paternity testing if the court finds that there is good cause to believe that the moving party is not the child's father and that the moving party may be entitled to relief under this section. If genetic paternity testing is ordered, the provisions of G.S. 8‑50.1(b1) shall govern the admissibility and weight of the genetic test results. The moving party shall pay the costs of genetic testing. If a party fails to comply with an order for genetic testing without good cause, the court may hold the party in civil or criminal contempt or impose appropriate sanctions under G.S. 1A‑1, Rule 37, of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure, or both. Nothing in this subsection shall be construed to require additional genetic paternity testing if paternity has been set aside pursuant to G.S. 49‑14 or G.S. 110‑132.

(e) The moving party's child support obligation shall be suspended while the motion or claim is pending before the court if the support is being paid on behalf of the child to the State, or any other assignee of child support, where the child is in the custody of the State or other assignee, or where the moving party is an obligor in a IV‑D case as defined in G.S. 110‑129(7).

The moving party's child support obligation shall not be suspended while the motion or claim is pending before the court if the support is being paid to the mother of the child.

(f) The court may grant relief from a child support order under this section if paternity has been set aside pursuant to G.S. 49‑14 or G.S. 110‑132, or if the moving party proves by clear and convincing evidence, and the court, sitting without a jury, finds both of the following:

(1) The results of a valid genetic test establish that the moving party is not the child's biological father.

(2) The moving party either (i) has not acknowledged paternity of the child or (ii) acknowledged paternity without knowing that he was not the child's biological father. For purposes of this section, "acknowledging paternity" means that the moving party has done any of the following:

a. Publicly acknowledged the child as his own and supported the child while married to the child's mother.

b. Acknowledged paternity in a sworn written statement, including an affidavit of parentage executed under G.S. 110‑132(a) or G.S. 130A‑101(f).

c. Executed a consent order, a voluntary support agreement under G.S. 110‑132 or G.S. 110‑133, or any other legal agreement to pay child support as the child's father.

d. Admitted paternity in open court or in any pleading.

(g) If the court determines that the moving party has not satisfied the requirements of this section, the court shall deny the motion or claim, and all orders regarding the child's paternity, support, or custody shall remain enforceable and in effect until modified as otherwise provided by law. If the court finds that the moving party did not act in good faith in filing a motion or claim pursuant to this section, the court shall award reasonable attorneys' fees to the prevailing party. The court shall make findings of fact and conclusions of law to support its award of attorneys' fees under this subsection.

(h) If the court determines that the moving party has satisfied the requirements of this section, the court shall enter an order, including written findings of fact and conclusions of law, terminating the moving party's child support obligation regarding the child. The court may tax as costs to the mother of the child the expenses of genetic testing.

Any unpaid support due prior to the filing of the motion or claim is due and owing. If the court finds that the mother of the child used fraud, duress, or misrepresentation, resulting in the belief on the part of the moving party that he was the father of the child, the court may order the mother of the child to reimburse any child support amounts paid and received by the mother after the filing of the motion or claim. The moving party has no right to reimbursement of past child support paid on behalf of the child to the State, or any other assignee of child support, where the child is in the custody of the State or other assignee, or where the moving party is an obligor in a IV‑D case as defined in G.S. 110‑129(7).

If the child was born in North Carolina and the moving party is named as the father on the child's birth certificate, the court shall order the clerk of superior court to notify the State Registrar of the court's order pursuant to G.S. 130A‑118(b)(2). If relief is granted under this subsection, a party may, to the extent otherwise provided by law, apply for modification of or relief from any judgment or order involving the moving party's paternity of the child.

(i) Any servicemember who is deployed on military orders, and is subject to the protections of the Servicemembers Civil Relief Act, shall have the period for filing a motion pursuant to subsection (b) of this section tolled during the servicemember's deployment. If the period remaining allowed for the filing of the motion following the servicemember's redeployment is less than 30 days, then the servicemember shall have 30 days for filing the motion. (2011‑328, s. 3.)

 

§§ 50‑14 through 50‑15.  Repealed by Session Laws 1967, c. 1152, s. 1.

 

§ 50‑16.  Repealed by Session Laws 1967, c. 1152, s. 1; c. 1153. s. 1.

 

§ 50‑16.1: Repealed by Session Laws 1995, c. 319, s. 1.

 

§ 50‑16.1A.  Definitions.

As used in this Chapter, unless the context clearly requires otherwise, the following definitions apply:

(1) "Alimony" means an order for payment for the support and maintenance of a spouse or former spouse, periodically or in a lump sum, for a specified or for an indefinite term, ordered in an action for divorce, whether absolute or from bed and board, or in an action for alimony without divorce.

(2) "Dependent spouse" means a spouse, whether husband or wife, who is actually substantially dependent upon the other spouse for his or her maintenance and support or is substantially in need of maintenance and support from the other spouse.

(3) "Marital misconduct" means any of the following acts that occur during the marriage and prior to or on the date of separation:

a. Illicit sexual behavior. For the purpose of this section, illicit sexual behavior means acts of sexual or deviate sexual intercourse, deviate sexual acts, or sexual acts defined in G.S. 14‑27.20(4), voluntarily engaged in by a spouse with someone other than the other spouse;

b. Involuntary separation of the spouses in consequence of a criminal act committed prior to the proceeding in which alimony is sought;

c. Abandonment of the other spouse;

d. Malicious turning out‑of‑doors of the other spouse;

e. Cruel or barbarous treatment endangering the life of the other spouse;

f. Indignities rendering the condition of the other spouse intolerable and life burdensome;

g. Reckless spending of the income of either party, or the destruction, waste, diversion, or concealment of assets;

h. Excessive use of alcohol or drugs so as to render the condition of the other spouse intolerable and life burdensome;

i. Willful failure to provide necessary subsistence according to one's means and condition so as to render the condition of the other spouse intolerable and life burdensome.

(3a) through (3d)  Reserved for future codification purposes.

(3e) "Payor" means any payor, including any federal, State, or local governmental unit, of disposable income to an obligor. When the payor is an employer, payor means employer as defined under 20 U.S.C. § 203(d) of the Fair Labor Standards Act.

(4) "Postseparation support" means spousal support to be paid until the earlier of any of the following:

a. The date specified in the order for postseparation support.

b. The entry of an order awarding or denying alimony.

c. The dismissal of the alimony claim.

d. The entry of a judgment of absolute divorce if no claim of alimony is pending at the time of entry of the judgment of absolute divorce.

e. Termination of postseparation support as provided in G.S. 50‑16.9(b).

Postseparation support may be ordered in an action for divorce, whether absolute or from bed and board, for annulment, or for alimony without divorce. However, if postseparation support is ordered at the time of the entry of a judgment of absolute divorce, a claim for alimony must be pending at the time of the entry of the judgment of divorce.

(5) "Supporting spouse" means a spouse, whether husband or wife, upon whom the other spouse is actually substantially dependent for maintenance and support or from whom such spouse is substantially in need of maintenance and support. (1995, c. 319, s. 2; 1998‑176, s. 8; 2005‑177, s. 1; 2015‑181, s. 20.)

 

§ 50‑16.2:  Repealed by Session Laws 1995, c.  319, s. 1.

 

§ 50‑16.2A.  Postseparation support.

(a) In an action brought pursuant to Chapter 50 of the General Statutes, either party may move for postseparation support. The verified pleading, verified motion, or affidavit of the moving party shall set forth the factual basis for the relief requested.

(b) In ordering postseparation support, the court shall base its award on the financial needs of the parties, considering the parties' accustomed standard of living, the present employment income and other recurring earnings of each party from any source, their income‑earning abilities, the separate and marital debt service obligations, those expenses reasonably necessary to support each of the parties, and each party's respective legal obligations to support any other persons.

(c) Except when subsection (d) of this section applies, a dependent spouse is entitled to an award of postseparation support if, based on consideration of the factors specified in subsection (b) of this section, the court finds that the resources of the dependent spouse are not adequate to meet his or her reasonable needs and the supporting spouse has the ability to pay.

(d) At a hearing on postseparation support, the judge shall consider marital misconduct by the dependent spouse occurring prior to or on the date of separation in deciding whether to award postseparation support and in deciding the amount of postseparation support. When the judge considers these acts by the dependent spouse, the judge shall also consider any marital misconduct by the supporting spouse in deciding whether to award postseparation support and in deciding the amount of postseparation support.

(e) Nothing herein shall prevent a court from considering incidents of post date‑of‑separation marital misconduct as corroborating evidence supporting other evidence that marital misconduct occurred during the marriage and prior to date of separation. (1995, c. 319, s. 2.)

 

§ 50‑16.3:  Repealed by Session Laws 1995, c.  319, s. 1.

 

§ 50‑16.3A.  Alimony.

(a) Entitlement. – In an action brought pursuant to Chapter 50 of the General Statutes, either party may move for alimony. The court shall award alimony to the dependent spouse upon a finding that one spouse is a dependent spouse, that the other spouse is a supporting spouse, and that an award of alimony is equitable after considering all relevant factors, including those set out in subsection (b) of this section. If the court finds that the dependent spouse participated in an act of illicit sexual behavior, as defined in G.S. 50‑16.1A(3)a., during the marriage and prior to or on the date of separation, the court shall not award alimony. If the court finds that the supporting spouse participated in an act of illicit sexual behavior, as defined in G.S. 50‑16.1A(3)a., during the marriage and prior to or on the date of separation, then the court shall order that alimony be paid to a dependent spouse. If the court finds that the dependent and the supporting spouse each participated in an act of illicit sexual behavior during the marriage and prior to or on the date of separation, then alimony shall be denied or awarded in the discretion of the court after consideration of all of the circumstances. Any act of illicit sexual behavior by either party that has been condoned by the other party shall not be considered by the court.

The claim for alimony may be heard on the merits prior to the entry of a judgment for equitable distribution, and if awarded, the issues of amount and of whether a spouse is a dependent or supporting spouse may be reviewed by the court after the conclusion of the equitable distribution claim.

(b) Amount and Duration. – The court shall exercise its discretion in determining the amount, duration, and manner of payment of alimony. The duration of the award may be for a specified or for an indefinite term. In determining the amount, duration, and manner of payment of alimony, the court shall consider all relevant factors, including:

(1) The marital misconduct of either of the spouses. Nothing herein shall prevent a court from considering incidents of post date‑of‑separation marital misconduct as corroborating evidence supporting other evidence that marital misconduct occurred during the marriage and prior to date of separation;

(2) The relative earnings and earning capacities of the spouses;

(3) The ages and the physical, mental, and emotional conditions of the spouses;

(4) The amount and sources of earned and unearned income of both spouses, including, but not limited to, earnings, dividends, and benefits such as medical, retirement, insurance, social security, or others;

(5) The duration of the marriage;

(6) The contribution by one spouse to the education, training, or increased earning power of the other spouse;

(7) The extent to which the earning power, expenses, or financial obligations of a spouse will be affected by reason of serving as the custodian of a minor child;

(8) The standard of living of the spouses established during the marriage;

(9) The relative education of the spouses and the time necessary to acquire sufficient education or training to enable the spouse seeking alimony to find employment to meet his or her reasonable economic needs;

(10) The relative assets and liabilities of the spouses and the relative debt service requirements of the spouses, including legal obligations of support;

(11) The property brought to the marriage by either spouse;

(12) The contribution of a spouse as homemaker;

(13) The relative needs of the spouses;

(14) The federal, State, and local tax ramifications of the alimony award;

(15) Any other factor relating to the economic circumstances of the parties that the court finds to be just and proper.

(16) The fact that income received by either party was previously considered by the court in determining the value of a marital or divisible asset in an equitable distribution of the parties' marital or divisible property.

(c) Findings of Fact. – The court shall set forth the reasons for its award or denial of alimony and, if making an award, the reasons for its amount, duration, and manner of payment. Except where there is a motion before the court for summary judgment, judgment on the pleadings, or other motion for which the Rules of Civil Procedure do not require special findings of fact, the court shall make a specific finding of fact on each of the factors in subsection (b) of this section if evidence is offered on that factor.

(d) In the claim for alimony, either spouse may request a jury trial on the issue of marital misconduct as defined in G.S. 50‑16.1A. If a jury trial is requested, the jury will decide whether either spouse or both have established marital misconduct. (1995, c. 319, s. 2; c. 509, s. 135.2(b); 1998‑176, s. 11.)

 

§ 50‑16.4.  Counsel fees in actions for alimony, postseparation support.

At any time that a dependent spouse would be entitled to alimony pursuant to G.S. 50‑16.3A, or postseparation support pursuant to G.S. 50‑16.2A, the court may, upon application of such spouse, enter an order for reasonable counsel fees, to be paid and secured by the supporting spouse in the same manner as alimony. (1967, c. 1152, s. 2; 1995, c. 319, s. 3; 2010‑14, s. 1.)

 

§ 50‑16.5:  Repealed by Session Laws 1995, c.  319, s. 1.

 

§ 50‑16.6.  When alimony, postseparation support, counsel fees not payable.

(a) Repealed by Session Laws 1995, c. 319, s. 4.

(b) Alimony, postseparation support, and counsel fees may be barred by an express provision of a valid separation agreement, premarital agreement, or marital contract made pursuant to G.S. 52‑10(a1) so long as the agreement is performed. (1871‑2, c. 193, s. 39; Code, s. 1292; Rev., s. 1567; 1919, c. 24; C.S., s. 1667; 1921, c. 123; 1923, c. 52; 1951, c. 893, s. 3; 1953, c. 925; 1955, cc. 814, 1189; 1967, c. 1152, s. 2; 1995, c. 319, s. 4; c. 509, s. 135.3(f); 2013‑140, s. 2.)

 

§ 50‑16.7.  How alimony and postseparation support paid; enforcement of decree.

(a) Alimony or postseparation support shall be paid by lump sum payment, periodic payments, income withholding, or by transfer of title or possession of personal property or any interest therein, or a security interest in or possession of real property, as the court may order. The court may order the transfer of title to real property solely owned by the obligor in payment of lump‑sum payments of alimony or postseparation support or in payment of arrearages of alimony or postseparation support so long as the net value of the interest in the property being transferred does not exceed the amount of the arrearage being satisfied. In every case in which either alimony or postseparation support is allowed and provision is also made for support of minor children, the order shall separately state and identify each allowance.

(b) The court may require the supporting spouse to secure the payment of alimony or postseparation support so ordered by means of a bond, mortgage, or deed of trust, or any other means ordinarily used to secure an obligation to pay money or transfer property, or by requiring the supporting spouse to execute an assignment of wages, salary, or other income due or to become due.

(c) If the court requires the transfer of real or personal property or an interest therein as a part of an order for alimony or postseparation support as provided in subsection (a) or for the securing thereof, the court may also enter an order which shall transfer title, as provided in G.S. 1A‑1, Rule 70 and G.S. 1‑228.

(d) The remedy of arrest and bail, as provided in Article 34 of Chapter 1 of the General Statutes, shall be available in actions for alimony or postseparation support as in other cases.

(e) The remedies of attachment and garnishment, as provided in Article 35 of Chapter 1 and Article 9 of Chapter 110 of the General Statutes, shall be available in actions for alimony or postseparation support as in other cases, and for such purposes the dependent spouse shall be deemed a creditor of the supporting spouse.

(f) The remedy of injunction, as provided in Article 37 of Chapter 1 of the General Statutes and G.S. 1A‑1, Rule 65, shall be available in actions for alimony or postseparation support as in other cases.

(g) Receivers, as provided in Article 38 of Chapter 1 of the General Statutes, may be appointed in actions for alimony or postseparation support as in other cases.

(h) A dependent spouse for whose benefit an order for the payment of alimony or postseparation support has been entered shall be a creditor within the meaning of Article 3A of Chapter 39 of the General Statutes pertaining to voidable transactions.

(i) A judgment for alimony or postseparation support obtained in an action therefor shall not be a lien against real property unless the judgment expressly so provides, sets out the amount of the lien in a sum certain, and adequately describes the real property affected; but past‑due periodic payments may by motion in the cause or by a separate action be reduced to judgment which shall be a lien as other judgments.

(j) Any order for the payment of alimony or postseparation support is enforceable by proceedings for civil contempt, and its disobedience may be punished by proceedings for criminal contempt, as provided in Chapter 5A of the General Statutes.

Notwithstanding the provisions of G.S. 1‑294 or G.S. 1‑289, an order for the periodic payment of alimony that has been appealed to the appellate division is enforceable in the trial court by proceedings for civil contempt during the pendency of the appeal. Upon motion of an aggrieved party, the court of the appellate division in which the appeal is pending may stay any order for civil contempt entered for alimony until the appeal is decided if justice requires.

(k) The remedies provided by Chapter 1 of the General Statutes Article 28, Execution; Article 29B, Execution Sales; and Article 31, Supplemental Proceedings, shall be available for the enforcement of judgments for alimony and postseparation support as in other cases, but amounts so payable shall not constitute a debt as to which property is exempt from execution as provided in Article 16 of Chapter 1C of the General Statutes.

(l) The specific enumeration of remedies in this section shall not constitute a bar to remedies otherwise available.

(l1) The dependent spouse may apply to the court for an order of income withholding for current or delinquent payments of alimony or postseparation support or for any portion of the payments. If the court orders income withholding, a notice of obligation to withhold shall be served on the payor as required by G.S. 1A‑1, Rule 4, Rules of Civil Procedure. Copies of the notice shall be filed with the clerk of court and served upon the supporting spouse by first‑class mail. (1967, c. 1152, s. 2; 1969, c. 541, s. 5; c. 895, s. 18; 1977, c. 711, s. 26; 1985, c. 482, s. 1; c. 689, s. 18; 1995 c. 319, s. 5; 1998‑176, ss. 2, 3; 1999‑456, s. 14; 2015‑23, s. 3.)

 

§ 50‑16.8.  Procedure in actions for postseparation support.

When an application is made for postseparation support, the court may base its award on a verified pleading, affidavit, or other competent evidence. The court shall set forth the reasons for its award or denial of postseparation support, and if making an award, the reasons for its amount, duration, and manner of payment. (1871‑2, c. 193, ss. 37, 38, 39; 1883, c. 67; Code, ss. 1290, 1291, 1292; Rev., ss. 1565, 1566, 1567; 1919, c. 24; C.S., ss. 1665, 1666, 1667; 1921, c. 123; 1923, c. 52; 1951, c. 893, s. 3; 1953, c. 925; 1955, cc. 814, 1189; 1961, c. 80; 1967, c. 1152, s. 2; 1971, c. 1185, s. 25; 1979, c. 709, s. 4; 1995, c. 319, s. 6.)

 

§ 50‑16.9.  Modification of order.

(a) An order of a court of this State for alimony or postseparation support, whether contested or entered by consent, may be modified or vacated at any time, upon motion in the cause and a showing of changed circumstances by either party or anyone interested. This section shall not apply to orders entered by consent before October 1, 1967.

Any motion to modify or terminate alimony or postseparation support based on a resumption of marital relations between parties who remain married to each other shall be determined pursuant to G.S. 52‑10.2.

(b) If a dependent spouse who is receiving postseparation support or alimony from a supporting spouse under a judgment or order of a court of this State remarries or engages in cohabitation, the postseparation support or alimony shall terminate. Postseparation support or alimony shall terminate upon the death of either the supporting or the dependent spouse.

As used in this subsection, cohabitation means the act of two adults dwelling together continuously and habitually in a private heterosexual relationship, even if this relationship is not solemnized by marriage, or a private homosexual relationship. Cohabitation is evidenced by the voluntary mutual assumption of those marital rights, duties, and obligations which are usually manifested by married people, and which include, but are not necessarily dependent on, sexual relations. Nothing in this section shall be construed to make lawful conduct which is made unlawful by other statutes.

(c) When an order for alimony has been entered by a court of another jurisdiction, a court of this State may, upon gaining jurisdiction over the person of both parties in a civil action instituted for that purpose, and upon a showing of changed circumstances, enter a new order for alimony which modifies or supersedes such order for alimony to the extent that it could have been so modified in the jurisdiction where granted. (1871‑2, c. 193, ss. 38, 39; 1883, c. 67; Code, ss. 1291, 1292; Rev., ss. 1566, 1567; 1919, c. 24; C.S., ss. 1666, 1667; 1921, c. 123; 1923, c. 52; 1951, c. 893, s. 3; 1953, c. 925; 1955, cc. 814, 1189; 1961, c. 80; 1967, c. 1152, s. 2; 1987, c. 664, s. 3; 1995, c. 319, s. 7.)

 

§ 50‑16.10.  Alimony without action.

Alimony without action may be allowed by confession of judgment under G.S. 1A‑1, Rule 68.1. (1967, c. 1152, s. 2; 1985, c. 689, s. 19.)

 

§ 50‑16.11:  Repealed by Session Laws 1995, c.  319, s. 1.

 

§ 50‑17.  Alimony in real estate, writ of possession issued.

In all cases in which the court grants alimony by the assignment of real estate, the court has power to issue a writ of possession when necessary in the judgment of the court to do so. (1868‑9, c. 123, s. 1; Code, s. 1293; Rev., s. 1568; C.S., s. 1668.)

 

§ 50‑18.  Residence of military personnel; payment of defendant's travel expenses by plaintiff.

In any action instituted and prosecuted under this Chapter, allegation and proof that the plaintiff or the defendant has resided or been stationed at a United States Army, Navy, Marine Corps, Coast Guard, or Air Force installation or reservation or any other location pursuant to military duty within this State for a period of six months next preceding the institution of the action shall constitute compliance with the residence requirements set forth in this Chapter; provided that personal service is had upon the defendant or service is accepted by the defendant, within or without the State as by law provided.

Upon request of the defendant or attorney for the defendant, the court may order the plaintiff to pay necessary travel expenses from defendant's home to the site of the court in order that the defendant may appear in person to defend said action. (1959, c. 1058; 2011‑183, s. 39.)

 

§ 50‑19.  Maintenance of certain actions as independent actions permissible.

(a) Notwithstanding the provisions of G.S. 1A‑1, Rule 13(a), any action for divorce under the provisions of G.S. 50‑5.1 or G.S. 50‑6 that is filed as an independent, separate action may be prosecuted during the pendency of an action for:

(1) Alimony;

(2) Postseparation support;

(3) Custody and support of minor children;

(4) Custody and support of a person incapable of self‑support upon reaching majority; or

(5) Divorce pursuant to G.S. 50‑5.1 or G.S. 50‑6.

(b) Notwithstanding the provisions of G.S. 1A‑1, Rule 13(a), any action described in subdivision (a)(1) through (a)(5) of this section that is filed as an independent, separate action may be prosecuted during the pendency of an action for divorce under G.S. 50‑5.1 or G.S. 50‑6.

(c) Repealed by Session Laws 1991, c. 569, s. 1. (1979, c. 709, s. 2; 1985, c. 689, s. 20; 1991, c. 569, s. 1; 1995, c. 319, s. 10.)

 

§ 50‑19.1.  Maintenance of certain appeals allowed.

Notwithstanding any other pending claims filed in the same action, a party may appeal from an order or judgment adjudicating a claim for absolute divorce, divorce from bed and board, the validity of a premarital agreement as defined by G.S. 52B‑2(1), child custody, child support, alimony, or equitable distribution if the order or judgment would otherwise be a final order or judgment within the meaning of G.S. 1A‑1, Rule 54(b), but for the other pending claims in the same action. A party does not forfeit the right to appeal under this section if the party fails to immediately appeal from an order or judgment described in this section. An appeal from an order or judgment under this section shall not deprive the trial court of jurisdiction over any other claims pending in the same action. (2013‑411, s. 2; 2018‑86, s. 1.)

 

§ 50‑20.  Distribution by court of marital and divisible property.

(a) Upon application of a party, the court shall determine what is the marital property and divisible property and shall provide for an equitable distribution of the marital property and divisible property between the parties in accordance with the provisions of this section.

(b) For purposes of this section:

(1) "Marital property" means all real and personal property acquired by either spouse or both spouses during the course of the marriage and before the date of the separation of the parties, and presently owned, except property determined to be separate property or divisible property in accordance with subdivision (2) or (4) of this subsection. Marital property includes all vested and nonvested pension, retirement, and other deferred compensation rights, and vested and nonvested military pensions eligible under the federal Uniformed Services Former Spouses' Protection Act. It is presumed that all property acquired after the date of marriage and before the date of separation is marital property except property which is separate property under subdivision (2) of this subsection. It is presumed that all real property creating a tenancy by the entirety acquired after the date of marriage and before the date of separation is marital property. Either presumption may be rebutted by the greater weight of the evidence.

(2) "Separate property" means all real and personal property acquired by a spouse before marriage or acquired by a spouse by devise, descent, or gift during the course of the marriage. However, property acquired by gift from the other spouse during the course of the marriage shall be considered separate property only if such an intention is stated in the conveyance. Property acquired in exchange for separate property shall remain separate property regardless of whether the title is in the name of the husband or wife or both and shall not be considered to be marital property unless a contrary intention is expressly stated in the conveyance. The increase in value of separate property and the income derived from separate property shall be considered separate property. All professional licenses and business licenses which would terminate on transfer shall be considered separate property.

(3) "Distributive award" means payments that are payable either in a lump sum or over a period of time in fixed amounts, but shall not include alimony payments or other similar payments for support and maintenance which are treated as ordinary income to the recipient under the Internal Revenue Code.

(4) "Divisible property" means all real and personal property as set forth below:

a. All appreciation and diminution in value of marital property and divisible property of the parties occurring after the date of separation and prior to the date of distribution, except that appreciation or diminution in value which is the result of postseparation actions or activities of a spouse shall not be treated as divisible property.

b. All property, property rights, or any portion thereof received after the date of separation but before the date of distribution that was acquired as a result of the efforts of either spouse during the marriage and before the date of separation, including, but not limited to, commissions, bonuses, and contractual rights.

c. Passive income from marital property received after the date of separation, including, but not limited to, interest and dividends.

d. Passive increases and passive decreases in marital debt and financing charges and interest related to marital debt.

(c) There shall be an equal division by using net value of marital property and net value of divisible property unless the court determines that an equal division is not equitable. If the court determines that an equal division is not equitable, the court shall divide the marital property and divisible property equitably. The court shall consider all of the following factors under this subsection:

(1) The income, property, and liabilities of each party at the time the division of property is to become effective.

(2) Any obligation for support arising out of a prior marriage.

(3) The duration of the marriage and the age and physical and mental health of both parties.

(4) The need of a parent with custody of a child or children of the marriage to occupy or own the marital residence and to use or own its household effects.

(5) The expectation of pension, retirement, or other deferred compensation rights that are not marital property.

(6) Any equitable claim to, interest in, or direct or indirect contribution made to the acquisition of such marital property by the party not having title, including joint efforts or expenditures and contributions and services, or lack thereof, as a spouse, parent, wage earner or homemaker.

(7) Any direct or indirect contribution made by one spouse to help educate or develop the career potential of the other spouse.

(8) Any direct contribution to an increase in value of separate property which occurs during the course of the marriage.

(9) The liquid or nonliquid character of all marital property and divisible property.

(10) The difficulty of evaluating any component asset or any interest in a business, corporation or profession, and the economic desirability of retaining such asset or interest, intact and free from any claim or interference by the other party.

(11) The tax consequences to each party, including those federal and State tax consequences that would have been incurred if the marital and divisible property had been sold or liquidated on the date of valuation. The trial court may, however, in its discretion, consider whether or when such tax consequences are reasonably likely to occur in determining the equitable value deemed appropriate for this factor.

(11a) Acts of either party to maintain, preserve, develop, or expand; or to waste, neglect, devalue or convert the marital property or divisible property, or both, during the period after separation of the parties and before the time of distribution.

(11b) In the event of the death of either party prior to the entry of any order for the distribution of property made pursuant to this subsection:

a. Property passing to the surviving spouse by will or through intestacy due to the death of a spouse.

b. Property held as tenants by the entirety or as joint tenants with rights of survivorship passing to the surviving spouse due to the death of a spouse.

c. Property passing to the surviving spouse from life insurance, individual retirement accounts, pension or profit‑sharing plans, any private or governmental retirement plan or annuity of which the decedent controlled the designation of beneficiary (excluding any benefits under the federal social security system), or any other retirement accounts or contracts, due to the death of a spouse.

d. The surviving spouse's right to claim an "elective share" pursuant to G.S. 30‑3.1 through G.S. 30‑33, unless otherwise waived.

(12) Any other factor which the court finds to be just and proper.

(c1) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, a second or subsequent spouse acquires no interest in the marital property and divisible property of his or her spouse from a former marriage until a final determination of equitable distribution is made in the marital property and divisible property of the spouse's former marriage.

(d) Before, during or after marriage the parties may by written agreement, duly executed and acknowledged in accordance with the provisions of G.S. 52‑10 and 52‑10.1, or by a written agreement valid in the jurisdiction where executed, provide for distribution of the marital property or divisible property, or both, in a manner deemed by the parties to be equitable and the agreement shall be binding on the parties.

(e) Subject to the presumption of subsection (c) of this section that an equal division is equitable, it shall be presumed in every action that an in‑kind distribution of marital or divisible property is equitable. This presumption may be rebutted by the greater weight of the evidence, or by evidence that the property is a closely held business entity or is otherwise not susceptible of division in‑kind. In any action in which the presumption is rebutted, the court in lieu of in‑kind distribution shall provide for a distributive award in order to achieve equity between the parties. The court may provide for a distributive award to facilitate, effectuate or supplement a distribution of marital or divisible property. The court may provide that any distributive award payable over a period of time be secured by a lien on specific property.

(f) The court shall provide for an equitable distribution without regard to alimony for either party or support of the children of both parties. After the determination of an equitable distribution, the court, upon request of either party, shall consider whether an order for alimony or child support should be modified or vacated pursuant to G.S. 50‑16.9 or 50‑13.7.

(g) If the court orders the transfer of real or personal property or an interest therein, the court may also enter an order which shall transfer title, as provided in G.S. 1A‑1, Rule 70 and G.S. 1‑228.

(h) If either party claims that any real property is marital property or divisible property, that party may cause a notice of lis pendens to be recorded pursuant to Article 11 of Chapter 1 of the General Statutes. Any person whose conveyance or encumbrance is recorded or whose interest is obtained by descent, prior to the filing of the lis pendens, shall take the real property free of any claim resulting from the equitable distribution proceeding. The court may cancel the notice of lis pendens upon substitution of a bond with surety in an amount determined by the court to be sufficient provided the court finds that the claim of the spouse against property subject to the notice of lis pendens can be satisfied by money damages.

(i) Upon filing an action or motion in the cause requesting an equitable distribution or alleging that an equitable distribution will be requested when it is timely to do so, a party may seek injunctive relief pursuant to G.S. 1A‑1, Rule 65 and Chapter 1, Article 37, to prevent the disappearance, waste or conversion of property alleged to be marital property, divisible property, or separate property of the party seeking relief. The court, in lieu of granting an injunction, may require a bond or other assurance of sufficient amount to protect the interest of the other spouse in the property. Upon application by the owner of separate property which was removed from the marital home or possession of its owner by the other spouse, the court may enter an order for reasonable counsel fees and costs of court incurred to regain its possession, but such fees shall not exceed the fair market value of the separate property at the time it was removed.

(i1) Unless good cause is shown that there should not be an interim distribution, the court may, at any time after an action for equitable distribution has been filed and prior to the final judgment of equitable distribution, enter orders declaring what is separate property and may also enter orders dividing part of the marital property, divisible property or debt, or marital debt between the parties. The partial distribution may provide for a distributive award and may also provide for a distribution of marital property, marital debt, divisible property, or divisible debt. Any such orders entered shall be taken into consideration at trial and proper credit given.

Hearings held pursuant to this subsection may be held at sessions arranged by the chief district court judge pursuant to G.S. 7A‑146 and, if held at such sessions, shall not be subject to the reporting requirements of G.S. 7A‑198.

(j) In any order for the distribution of property made pursuant to this section, the court shall make written findings of fact that support the determination that the marital property and divisible property has been equitably divided.

(k) The rights of the parties to an equitable distribution of marital property and divisible property are a species of common ownership, the rights of the respective parties vesting at the time of the parties' separation.

(l) (1) A claim for equitable distribution, whether an action is filed or not, survives the death of a spouse so long as the parties are living separate and apart at the time of death.

(2) The provisions of Article 19 of Chapter 28A of the General Statutes shall be applicable to a claim for equitable distribution against the estate of the deceased spouse.

(3) Any claim for equitable distribution against the surviving spouse made by the estate of the deceased spouse must be filed with the district court within one year of the date of death of the deceased spouse or be forever barred. (1981, c. 815, s. 1; 1983, c. 309; c. 640, ss. 1, 2; c. 758, ss. 1‑4; 1985, c. 31, ss. 1‑3; c. 143; c. 660, ss. 1‑3; 1987, c. 663; c. 844, s. 2; 1991, c. 635, ss. 1, 1.1; 1991 (Reg. Sess., 1992), c. 960, s. 1; 1995, c. 240, s. 1; c. 245, s. 2; 1997‑212, ss. 2‑5; 1997‑302, s. 1; 1998‑217, s. 7(c); 2001‑364, ss. 2, 3; 2002‑159, s. 33; 2003‑168, ss. 1, 2; 2005‑353, s. 1; 2011‑284, s. 51; 2013‑103, s. 1.)

 

§ 50‑20.1.  Pension, retirement, and deferred compensation benefits.

(a) The distribution of vested marital pension, retirement, or deferred compensation benefits may be made payable by any of the following means:

(1) As a lump sum from the plan, program, system, or fund for those benefits subject to subsection (d1) of this section.

(2) Over a period of time in fixed amounts from the plan, program, system, or fund for those benefits subject to subsection (d1) of this section.

(3) As a prorated portion of the benefits made to the designated recipient, if permitted by the plan, program, system, or fund (i) at the time the participant‑spouse is eligible to receive the benefits, (ii) at the time the participant‑spouse actually begins to receive the benefits, or (iii) at the participant‑spouse's earliest retirement age. For purposes of this section, "participant‑spouse" means the spouse who is a participant in the plan, program, system, or fund.

(4) By awarding a larger portion of other assets to the party not receiving the benefits and a smaller share of other assets to the party entitled to receive the benefits.

(5) As a lump sum, or over a period of time in fixed amounts, by agreement.

(b) The distribution of nonvested marital pension, retirement, or deferred compensation benefits may be made payable by any of the following means:

(1) As a lump sum by agreement.

(2) Over a period of time in fixed amounts by agreement.

(3) As a prorated portion of the benefits made to the designated recipient, if permitted by the plan, program, system, or fund (i) at the time the participant‑spouse is eligible to receive the benefits, (ii) at the time the participant‑spouse actually begins to receive the benefits, or (iii) at the participant‑spouse's earliest retirement age.

(c) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsections (a) and (b) of this section, the court shall not require the administrator of the plan, program, system, or fund involved to make any payments or distributions to the nonparticipant spouse, except as permitted by the terms of the plan, program, system, or fund.

(d) When the amount of the benefit payable by the plan, program, system, or fund to the participant‑spouse is determined in whole or part by the length of time of the participant‑spouse's employment, the marital portion shall be determined using the proportion of time the marriage existed (up to the date of separation of the parties) simultaneously with the total time of the employment which earned the benefit subject to equitable distribution, to the total amount of time of employment that earned the benefit subject to equitable distribution. The determination shall be based on the vested and nonvested accrued benefit, as provided by the plan, program, system, or fund, calculated as of the date of separation, and shall not include contributions, years of service, or compensation which may accrue after the date of separation. The award shall include gains and losses on the prorated portion of the benefit vested at the date of separation and cost‑of‑living adjustments and similar enhancements to the participant's benefit. Notwithstanding any other provision of this Chapter, if the court makes the award payable pursuant to subdivision (a)(3) or (b)(3) of this section and the court divides the marital portion of the benefit equally between the participant‑spouse and nonparticipant spouse, the court shall not be required to determine the total value of the marital benefits before classifying and distributing the benefits. However, neither party shall be prohibited from presenting evidence of the total value of any marital benefits or of any benefits that are separate property of either spouse. When a pension, retirement, or deferred compensation plan, program, system, or fund, or an applicable statute limits or restricts the amount of the benefit subject to equitable distribution by a State court, the award shall be determined using the proportion of time the marriage existed (up to the date of separation of the parties) simultaneously with the total time of the employment which earned the benefit subject to equitable distribution to the total time of employment, as limited or restricted by the plan, program, system, fund, or statute that earned the benefit subject to equitable distribution.

(d1) When the amount of the benefit payable by the plan, program, system, or fund is not determined in whole or part by the length of time of the participant‑spouse's employment, but is instead based on contributions and held in one or more accounts with readily determinable balances, including, but not limited to, individual retirement accounts and defined contribution plans, such as those within the definitions of Internal Revenue Code section 401(k), 403(b), 408, 408A, or 457, the court shall not determine the award using the fraction described in subsection (d) of this section. The court instead shall determine the marital portion of the benefit by determining the amount of the account balance that is due to contributions made or earned during the marriage and before separation, together with the income, gains, losses, appreciation, and depreciation accrued on those contributions. If sufficient evidence is not presented to the court to allow the court to make this determination, the court shall then determine the marital portion of the benefit by using the fraction described in subsection (d) of this section, namely, by using the proportion of time the marriage existed (up to the date of separation of the parties) simultaneously with the employment which earned the benefit subject to equitable distribution to the total amount of time of employment. In either event, the award shall be based on the vested and nonvested accrued benefit as of the date of separation, together with the income, gains, losses, appreciation, and depreciation accrued after the date of separation on the date‑of‑separation benefits. However, the award shall not include contributions that may accrue or be made after the date of separation, or any income, gains, losses, appreciation, and depreciation accrued on those contributions.

(e) No award shall exceed fifty percent (50%) of the benefits the person against whom the award is made is entitled to receive as vested and nonvested pension, retirement, or deferred compensation benefits, except that an award may exceed fifty percent (50%) if (i) other assets subject to equitable distribution are insufficient; or (ii) there is difficulty in distributing any asset or any interest in a business, corporation, or profession; or (iii) it is economically desirable for one party to retain an asset or interest that is intact and free from any claim or interference by the other party; or (iv) more than one pension or retirement system or deferred compensation plan, program, system, or fund is involved, but the benefits award may not exceed fifty percent (50%) of the total benefits of all the plans added together; or (v) both parties consent. In no event shall an award exceed fifty percent (50%) if a plan, program, system, or fund prohibits an award in excess of fifty percent (50%).

(f) In the event the person receiving the award dies, the unpaid balance, if any, of the award shall pass to the beneficiaries of the recipient by will, if any, or by intestate succession, or by beneficiary designation with the plan, program, system, or fund consistent with the terms of the plan, program, system, or fund unless the plan, program, system, or fund prohibits such designation. In the event the person against whom the award is made dies, the award to the recipient shall remain payable to the extent permitted by the pension or retirement system or deferred compensation plan, program, system, or fund involved.

(f1) Whenever the award is made payable pursuant to subdivision (a)(3) or (b)(3) of this section, and the pension or retirement or deferred compensation plan, program, system, or fund permits the use of a "separate interest" approach in the order, there shall be a presumption, rebuttable by the greater weight of the evidence, that the "separate interest" approach shall be used to divide the benefit in question. For purposes of this section, the phrase "separate interest" approach means any method of dividing pension or retirement system or deferred compensation benefits in which the nonparticipant spouse, the spouse not a participant in the plan, program, system, or fund in question, receives an interest that allows the nonparticipant spouse to receive benefits in a manner independent, in whole or part, of the benefits received by the participant‑spouse, or to make elections concerning the receipt of benefits independently of the elections made by the participant‑spouse.

(f2) Whenever the pension or retirement or deferred compensation benefit is distributed pursuant to subdivision (a)(3) or (b)(3) of this section in an order that does not employ the "separate interest" approach, the court may, considering the length of the marriage and the ages of the parties, (i) award all or a portion of a survivor annuity to the nonparticipant spouse or former spouse and (ii) allocate the cost of providing the survivor annuity between the parties. The survivor annuity awarded by the court, if any, shall be allocated in accordance with the terms of the retirement plan, program, system, or fund.

(f3) Whenever the pension or retirement or deferred compensation plan, program, system, or fund does not automatically provide pre‑retirement survivor annuity protection for the nonparticipant spouse, the court shall order pre‑retirement survivor annuity protection for the nonparticipant spouse if permitted by the plan, program, system, or fund.

(f4) The court may allocate equally between the parties any fees assessed by a plan, program, system, or fund in order to process any domestic relations order or qualified domestic relations order.

(g) The court may require distribution of the award by means of a qualified domestic relations order, or as defined in section 414(p) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, or by domestic relations order or other appropriate order. To facilitate the calculating and payment of distributive awards, the administrator of the plan, program, system, or fund may be ordered to certify the total contributions, years of service, and pension, retirement, or other deferred compensation benefits payable.

(h) This section and G.S. 50‑21 shall apply to all vested and nonvested pension, retirement, and deferred compensation plans, programs, systems, or funds, including, but not limited to, uniformed services retirement programs, federal government plans, State government plans, local government plans, Railroad Retirement Act pensions, executive benefit plans, church plans, charitable organization plans, individual retirement accounts within the definitions of Internal Revenue Code sections 408 and 408A, and accounts within the definitions of Internal Revenue Code section 401(k), 403(b), or 457.

(i) If a plan, program, system, or fund deems unacceptable an order providing for a distribution of pension, retirement, or deferred compensation benefits, then the court may upon motion of a party enter a subsequent order clarifying or correcting its prior order, as may be necessary to comply with the specific technical requirements of the plan, program, system, or fund.

(j) Notwithstanding any other provision of this Chapter, a claim may be filed, either as a separate civil action or as a motion in the cause in an action brought pursuant to this Chapter, for an order effectuating the distribution of pension, retirement, or deferred compensation benefits provided for in a valid written agreement, as defined in G.S. 50‑20(d), whether or not a claim for equitable distribution has been filed or adjudicated. The court may enter an order effectuating the distribution provided for in the valid written agreement. (1997‑212, s. 1; 2019‑172, s. 1.)

 

§ 50‑21.  Procedures in actions for equitable distribution of property; sanctions for purposeful and prejudicial delay.

(a) At any time after a husband and wife begin to live separate and apart from each other, a claim for equitable distribution may be filed and adjudicated, either as a separate civil action, or together with any other action brought pursuant to Chapter 50 of the General Statutes, or as a motion in the cause as provided by G.S. 50‑11(e) or (f). Within 90 days after service of a claim for equitable distribution, the party who first asserts the claim shall prepare and serve upon the opposing party an equitable distribution inventory affidavit listing all property claimed by the party to be marital property and all property claimed by the party to be separate property, and the estimated date‑of‑separation fair market value of each item of marital and separate property. Within 30 days after service of the inventory affidavit, the party upon whom service is made shall prepare and serve an inventory affidavit upon the other party. The inventory affidavits prepared and served pursuant to this subsection shall be subject to amendment and shall not be binding at trial as to completeness or value. The court may extend the time limits in this subsection for good cause shown. The affidavits are subject to the requirements of G.S. 1A‑1, Rule 11, and are deemed to be in the nature of answers to interrogatories propounded to the parties. Any party failing to supply the information required by this subsection in the affidavit is subject to G.S. 1A‑1, Rules 26, 33, and 37. During the pendency of the action for equitable distribution, discovery may proceed, and the court shall enter temporary orders as appropriate and necessary for the purpose of preventing the disappearance, waste, or destruction of marital or separate property or to secure the possession thereof.

Real or personal property located outside of North Carolina is subject to equitable distribution in accordance with the provisions of G.S. 50‑20, and the court may include in its order appropriate provisions to ensure compliance with the order of equitable distribution.

(b) For purposes of equitable distribution, marital property shall be valued as of the date of the separation of the parties, and evidence of preseparation and postseparation occurrences or values is competent as corroborative evidence of the value of marital property as of the date of the separation of the parties. Divisible property and divisible debt shall be valued as of the date of distribution.

(c) Nothing in G.S. 50‑20 or this section shall restrict or extend the right to trial by jury as provided by the Constitution of North Carolina.

(d) Within 120 days after the filing of the initial pleading or motion in the cause for equitable distribution, the party first serving the pleading or application shall apply to the court to conduct a scheduling and discovery conference. If that party fails to make application, then the other party may do so. At the conference the court shall determine a schedule of discovery as well as consider and rule upon any motions for appointment of expert witnesses, or other applications, including applications to determine the date of separation, and shall set a date for the disclosure of expert witnesses and a date on or before which an initial pretrial conference shall be held.

At the initial pretrial conference the court shall make inquiry as to the status of the case and shall enter a date for the completion of discovery, the completion of a mediated settlement conference, if applicable, and the filing and service of motions, and shall determine a date on or after which a final pretrial conference shall be held and a date on or after which the case shall proceed to trial.

The final pretrial conference shall be conducted pursuant to the Rules of Civil Procedure and the General Rules of Practice in the applicable district or superior court, adopted pursuant to G.S. 7A‑34. The court shall rule upon any matters reasonably necessary to effect a fair and prompt disposition of the case in the interests of justice.

(e) Upon motion of either party or upon the court's own initiative, the court shall impose an appropriate sanction on a party when the court finds that:

(1) The party has willfully obstructed or unreasonably delayed, or has attempted to obstruct or unreasonably delay, discovery proceedings, including failure to make discovery pursuant to G.S. 1A‑1, Rule 37, or has willfully obstructed or unreasonably delayed or attempted to obstruct or unreasonably delay any pending equitable distribution proceeding, and

(2) The willful obstruction or unreasonable delay of the proceedings is or would be prejudicial to the interests of the opposing party.

Delay consented to by the parties is not grounds for sanctions. The sanction may include an order to pay the other party the amount of the reasonable expenses and damages incurred because of the willful obstruction or unreasonable delay, including a reasonable attorneys' fee, and including appointment by the court, at the offending party's expense, of an accountant, appraiser, or other expert whose services the court finds are necessary to secure in order for the discovery or other equitable distribution proceeding to be timely conducted. (1981, c. 815, s. 6; 1983, c. 671, s. 1; 1985, c. 689, s. 21; 1987, c. 844, s. 1; 1991, c. 610, s. 2; 1991 (Reg. Sess., 1992), c. 910, s. 1; 1993, c. 209, s. 1; 1995, c. 244, s. 1; c. 245, s. 1; 1997‑302, s. 2; 2001‑364, s. 1.)

 

§ 50‑22.  Action on behalf of an incompetent.

A duly appointed agent who has the power to sue and defend civil actions on behalf of an incompetent spouse and who has been appointed pursuant to a durable power of attorney executed in accordance with Chapter 32C of the General Statutes, a guardian appointed in accordance with Chapter 35A of the General Statutes, or a guardian ad litem appointed in accordance with G.S. 1A‑1, Rules 17 and 25(b), may commence, defend, maintain, arbitrate, mediate, or settle any action authorized by this Chapter on behalf of an incompetent spouse. However, only a competent spouse may commence an action for absolute divorce. (1991, c. 610, s. 1; 2009‑224, s. 1; 2017‑153, s. 2.4.)

 

§§ 50‑23 through 50‑29.  Reserved for future codification purposes.

 

 

Article 2.

Expedited Process for Child Support Cases.

§ 50‑30.  Findings; policy; and purpose.

(a) Findings. – The General Assembly makes the following findings:

(1) There is a strong public interest in providing fair, efficient, and swift judicial processes for establishing and enforcing child support obligations. Children are entitled to support from their parents, and court assistance is often required for the establishment and enforcement of parental support obligations. Children who do not receive support from their parents often become financially dependent on the State.

(2) The State shall have laws that meet the federal requirements on expedited processes for obtaining and enforcing child support orders for purposes of federal reimbursement under Title IV‑D of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 66(a)(2). The Secretary of the United States Department of Health and Human Services may waive the expedited process requirement with respect to one or more district court district as defined in G.S. 7A‑133 on the basis of the effectiveness and timeliness of support order issuance and enforcement within the district.

(3) The State has a strong financial interest in complying with the expedited process requirement, and other requirements, of Title IV‑D of the Social Security Act, but the State would incur substantial expense in creating statewide an expedited child support process as defined by federal law.

(4) The State's judicial system is largely capable of processing child support cases in a timely and efficient manner and has a strong commitment to an expeditious system.

(5) The substantial expense the State would incur in creating a new system for obtaining and enforcing child support orders would be reduced and better spent by improving the present system.

(b) Purpose and Policy. – It is the policy of this State to ensure, to the maximum extent possible, that child support obligations are established and enforced fairly, efficiently, and swiftly through the judicial system by means that make the best use of the State's resources. It is the purpose of this Article to facilitate this policy. The Administrative Office of the Courts and judicial officials in each district court district as defined in G.S. 7A‑133 shall make a diligent effort to ensure that child support cases, from the time of filing to the time of disposition, are handled fairly, efficiently, and swiftly. The Administrative Office of the Courts and the State Department of Health and Human Services shall work together to improve procedures for the handling of child support cases in which the State or county has an interest, including all cases that qualify in any respect for federal reimbursement under Title IV‑D of the Social Security Act. (1985 (Reg. Sess., 1986), c. 993, s. 1; 1987 (Reg. Sess., 1988), c. 1037, s. 86; 1997‑443, s. 11A.18.)

 

§ 50‑31.  Definitions.

As used in this Article, unless the context clearly requires otherwise:

(1) "Child support case" means the part of any civil or criminal action or proceeding, whether intrastate or interstate, that involves a claim for the establishment or enforcement of a child support obligation.

(2) "Dispose" or "disposition" of a child support case means the entry of an order in a child support case that:

a. Dismisses the claim for establishment or enforcement of the child support obligation; or

b. Establishes a child support obligation, either temporary or permanent, and directs how that obligation is to be satisfied; or

c. Orders a particular child support enforcement remedy.

(3) "Expedited process" means a procedure for having child support orders established and enforced by a magistrate or clerk who has been designated as a child support hearing officer pursuant to this Article.

(4) "Federal expedited process requirement" means the provision in Title IV, Part D of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 666(a)(2), that requires as a condition of the receipt of federal funds that a state have laws that require the use of federally defined expedited processes for obtaining and enforcing child support orders.

(5) "Filing" means the date the defendant is served with a pleading that seeks establishment or enforcement of a child support obligation, or the date written notice or a pleading is sent to a party seeking establishment or enforcement of a child support obligation.

(6) "Hearing officer" or "child support hearing officer" means a  clerk or assistant clerk of superior court or a magistrate who has been designated pursuant to this Article to hear and enter orders in child support cases.

(7) "Initiating party" means the party, the attorney for a party, a child support enforcement agency established pursuant to Title IV, Part D of the Social Security Act, or the clerk of superior court who initiates an action, proceeding, or procedure as allowed or required by law for the establishment or enforcement of a child support obligation. (1985 (Reg. Sess., 1986), c. 993, s. 1; 1987, c. 346.)

 

§ 50‑32.  Disposition of cases within 60 days; extension.

Except where paternity is at issue, in all child support cases the district court judge shall dispose of the case from filing to disposition within 60 days, except that this period may be extended for a maximum of 30 days by order of the court if:

(1) Either party or his attorney cannot be present for the hearing; or

(2) The parties have consented to an extension. (1985 (Reg. Sess., 1986), c. 993, s. 1.)

 

§ 50‑33.  Waiver of expedited process requirement.

(a) State to Seek Waiver. – The State Department of Health and Human Services, with the assistance of the Administrative Office of the Courts, shall vigorously pursue application to the United States Department of Health and Human Services for waivers of the federal expedited process requirement.

(b) Districts That Do Not Qualify. – In any district court district as defined in G.S. 7A‑133 that does not qualify for a waiver of the federal expedited process requirement, an expedited process shall be established as provided in G.S. 50‑34. (1985 (Reg. Sess., 1986), c. 993, s. 1; 1987 (Reg. Sess., 1988), c. 1037, s. 87; 1997‑443, s. 11A.19.)

 

§ 50‑34.  Establishment of an expedited process.

(a) Districts Required to Have Expedited Process. – In any district court district as defined in G.S. 7A‑133 that is required by G.S. 50‑33(b) to establish an expedited child support process, the Director of the Administrative Office of the Courts shall notify the chief district court judge and the clerk or clerks of superior court in the district in writing of the requirement. The Director of the Administrative Office of the Courts, the chief district court judge, and the clerk or clerks of superior court in the district shall implement an expedited child support process as provided in this section.

(b) Procedure for Establishing Expedited Process. – When a district court district as defined in G.S. 7A‑133 is required to implement an expedited process, the Director of the Administrative Office of the Courts, the chief district judge, and the clerk of superior court in an affected county shall determine by agreement whether the child support hearing officer or officers for that county shall be one or more clerks or one or more magistrates. If such agreement has not been reached within 15 days after the notice required by subsection (a) when implementation is required, the Director of the Administrative Office of the Courts shall make the decision. If it is decided that the hearing officer or officers for a county shall be magistrates, the chief district judge, the clerk of superior court, and the Director of the Administrative Office of the Courts shall ensure his or their qualification for the position. If it is decided that the hearing officer or officers for a county shall be the clerk or assistant clerks, the clerk of superior court in the county shall designate the person or persons to serve as hearing officer, and the chief district judge, the clerk of superior court, and the Director of the Administrative Office of the Courts shall ensure his or their qualification for the position.

(c) Public To Be Informed. – When an expedited process is to be implemented in a county or district court district as defined in G.S. 7A‑133, the chief district court judge, the clerk or clerks of superior court in affected counties in the district, and the Administrative Office of the Courts shall take steps to ensure that attorneys, the general public, and parties to pending child support cases in the county or district are informed of the change in procedures and helped to understand and use the new system effectively. (1985 (Reg. Sess., 1986), c. 993, s. 1; 1987 (Reg. Sess., 1988), c. 1037, s. 88.)

 

§ 50‑35.  Authority and duties of a child support hearing officer.

A child support hearing officer who is properly qualified and designated under this Article has the following authority and responsibilities in all child support cases:

(1) To conduct hearings and to ensure that the parties' due process rights are protected;

(2) To take testimony and establish a record;

(3) To evaluate evidence and make decisions regarding the establishment or enforcement of child support orders;

(4) To accept and approve voluntary acknowledgements of support liability and stipulated agreements setting the amount of support obligations;

(5) To accept and approve voluntary acknowledgements and affirmations of paternity;

(6) Except as otherwise provided in this Article, to enter child  support orders that have the same force and effect as orders entered by a district court judge;

(7) To enter temporary child support orders pending the resolution of unusual or complicated issues by a district court judge;

(8) To enter default orders; and

(9) To subpoena witnesses and documents. (1985 (Reg. Sess., 1986), c. 993, s. 1.)

 

§ 50‑36.  Child support procedures in districts with expedited process.

(a) Scheduling of Cases. – The procedures of this section shall apply to all child support cases in any district court district as defined in G.S. 7A‑133 or county in which an expedited process has been established. All claims for the establishment or enforcement of a child support obligation, whether the claim is made in a separate action or as part of a divorce or any other action, shall be scheduled for hearing before the child support hearing officer. The initiating party shall send a notice of the date, time, and place of the hearing to all other parties. Service of process shall be made and notices given as provided by G.S. 1A‑1, Rules of Civil Procedure.

(b) Place of Hearing. – The hearing before the child support hearing officer need not take place in a courtroom, but shall be conducted in an appropriate judicial setting.

(c) Hearing Procedures. – The hearing of a case before a child support officer is without a jury. The rules of evidence applicable in the trial of civil actions generally are observed; however, the hearing officer may require the parties to produce and may consider financial affidavits, State and federal tax returns, and other financial or employment records. Except as otherwise provided in this Article, the hearing officer shall determine the parties' child support rights and obligations and enter an appropriate order based on the evidence and the child support laws of the State. All parties shall be provided with a copy of the order.

(d) Record of Proceeding. – The record of a proceeding before a child support hearing officer shall consist of the pleadings filed in the child support case, documentation of proper service or notice or waiver, and a copy of the hearing officer's order. No verbatim recording or transcript shall be required or provided at State expense.

(e) Transfer to District Court Judge. – Upon his own motion or upon motion of any party, the hearing officer shall transfer a case for hearing before a district court judge when the case involves:

(1) A contested paternity action;

(2) A custody dispute;

(3) Contested visitation rights;

(4) The ownership, possession, or transfer of an interest in property to satisfy a child support obligation; or

(5) Other complex issues.

Upon ordering such a transfer, except in cases of contested paternity, the hearing officer shall also enter a temporary order that provides for the payment of a money amount or otherwise addresses the child's need for support pending the resolution of the case by the district court judge. The chief district court judge shall establish a procedure for such transferred cases to be given priority for hearing before a district court judge. (1985 (Reg. Sess., 1986), c. 993, s. 1; 1987 (Reg. Sess., 1988), c. 1037, s. 89.)

 

§ 50‑37.  Enforcement authority of child support hearing officer; contempt.

When a child support case is before a child support hearing officer for enforcement of a child support order, the hearing officer has the same authority that a district court judge would have, except in cases of contempt. Orders that commit a party to jail for civil or criminal contempt for the nonpayment of child support, or for otherwise failing to comply with a child support order, may be entered only by a district court judge. When it appears to a hearing officer that there is probable cause for finding such contempt in a case before the child support hearing officer and that no other enforcement remedy would be effective or sufficient, the hearing officer shall enter an order finding probable cause and referring the case for hearing before a district court judge. The order may indicate the amount of payment the responsible parent may make, or other action he may take, or both, to comply with the child support order. If proof of compliance is made to the hearing officer within a time specified in the order, the hearing officer may cancel the referral of the contempt case to district court. Except as specifically limited by this section, a clerk or magistrate acting as a child support hearing officer retains all of the contempt powers he or she otherwise has by  virtue of being a clerk or magistrate. (1985 (Reg. Sess., 1986), c. 993, s. 1.)

 

§ 50‑38.  Appeal from orders of the child support hearing officer.

(a) Appeal; Hearing De Novo. – Any party may appeal an order of a child support hearing officer for a hearing de novo before a district court judge by giving notice of appeal at the hearing or in writing within 10 days after entry of judgment. Upon appeal noted, the clerk of superior court shall place the case on the civil issue docket of the district court. The chief district court judge shall establish a procedure for such transferred cases to be given priority for hearing before a district court judge. Unless appealed from, the order of the hearing officer is final.

(b) Order Not Stayed Pending Appeal. – Appeal from an order of a child support hearing officer does not stay the execution or enforcement of the order unless, on application of the appellant, a district court judge orders such a stay. (1985 (Reg. Sess., 1986), c. 993, s. 1.)

 

§ 50‑39.  Qualifications of child support hearing officer.

(a) Qualifications. – A clerk or assistant clerk of superior court or a magistrate, to be designated and serve as a child support hearing officer, shall satisfy each of the following qualifications:

(1) Be at least 21 years of age and not older than 70 years of age, and have a high school degree or its equivalent.

(2) Be qualified by training and temperament to be effective in relating to parties in child support cases and in conducting hearings fairly and efficiently.

(3) Be certified by the Administrative Office of the Courts as having completed the training required by subsection (b).

(4) Establish that he has one of the following qualifications;

a. Election or appointment as the clerk of superior court; or

b. Three years experience as an assistant clerk of superior court working in child support or related matters; or

c. Six years experience as an assistant clerk of superior court; or

d. Four years experience as a magistrate whose duties have included, in substantial part, the disposition of civil matters; or

e. Pursuant to G.S. 7A‑171.1, five to seven years eligibility for pay as a magistrate; or

f. Three years experience working in the field of child support enforcement or a related field.

(b) Training Required. – Before a clerk or assistant clerk or a magistrate may conduct hearings as a child support hearing officer he must satisfactorily complete a course of instruction in the conduct of such hearings established by the Administrative Office of the Courts. The Administrative Office of the Courts shall establish a course in the conduct of such hearings. The Administrative Office of the Courts may contract with qualified educational organizations to conduct the course of instruction and must reimburse the clerks or magistrates attending for travel and subsistence incurred in taking such training. (1985 (Reg. Sess., 1986), c. 993, s. 1.)

 

§ 50‑40.  Reserved for future codification purposes.

 

Article 3.

Family Law Arbitration Act.

§ 50‑41.  Purpose; short title.

(a) It is the policy of this State to allow, by agreement of all parties, the arbitration of all issues arising from a marital separation or divorce, except for the divorce itself, while preserving a right of modification based on substantial change of circumstances related to alimony, child custody, and child support. Pursuant to this policy, the purpose of this Article is to provide for arbitration as an efficient and speedy means of resolving these disputes, consistent with Chapters 50, 50A, 50B, 51, 52, 52B, and 52C of the General Statutes and similar legislation, to provide default rules for the conduct of arbitration proceedings, and to assure access to the courts of this State for proceedings ancillary to this arbitration.

(b) This Article may be cited as the North Carolina Family Law Arbitration Act. (1999‑185, s. 1.)

 

§ 50‑42.  Arbitration agreements made valid, irrevocable, and enforceable.

(a) During, or after marriage, parties may agree in writing to submit to arbitration any controversy, except for the divorce itself, arising out of the marital relationship. Before marriage, parties may agree in writing to submit to arbitration any controversy, except for child support, child custody, or the divorce itself, arising out of the marital relationship. This agreement is valid, enforceable, and irrevocable except with both parties' consent, without regard to the justiciable character of the controversy and without regard to whether litigation is pending as to the controversy.

(b) This Article does not apply to an agreement to arbitrate in which a provision stipulates that this Article does not apply or to any arbitration or award under an agreement in which a provision stipulates that this Article does not apply. (1999‑185, s. 1.)

 

§ 50‑42.1.  Nonwaivable provisions.

(a) Except as otherwise provided in subsections (b) and (c) of this section or in this Article, a party to an agreement to arbitrate or an arbitration proceeding may waive, or the parties may vary the effect of, the requirements of this Article to the extent provided by law. Any waiver or agreement must be in writing.

(b) Before a controversy arises that is subject to an agreement to arbitrate, a party to the agreement may not:

(1) Waive or agree to vary the effect of the requirements of G.S. 50‑42, 50‑49(a), (b), or (c), 50‑58, or 50‑59.

(2) Agree to unreasonably restrict the right to notice of the initiation of an arbitration proceeding under G.S. 50‑42.2(a) or (b).

(3) Agree to unreasonably restrict the right to disclosure of any facts by a neutral arbitrator under G.S. 50‑45.1.

(c) Except as otherwise provided in this Article, a party to an agreement to arbitrate or an arbitration proceeding may not waive, or the parties shall not vary the effect of, the requirements of this section or G.S. 50‑43, 50‑45(f), 50‑52 through 50‑57, or 50‑60 through 50‑62.

(d) Any waiver contrary to this section shall not be effective but shall not have the effect of voiding the agreement to arbitrate. (2005‑187, s. 1.)

 

§ 50‑42.2.  Notice.

(a) A person initiates an arbitration proceeding by giving written notice to the other parties to the agreement to arbitrate in the manner in which the parties have agreed or, in the absence of agreement, by certified or registered mail, return receipt requested, or by service as authorized for the commencement of a civil action under the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure.

(b) Unless a person objects to the lack or insufficiency of notice not later than the beginning of the hearing, the person's appearance at the hearing waives the objection.

(c) Except as otherwise provided in this Article, a person gives notice to another person by taking action that is reasonably necessary to inform the other person in the ordinary course of business, regardless of whether the person acquires knowledge of the notice.

(d) A person has notice if the person has knowledge of the notice or has received notice.

(e) A person receives notice when it comes to the person's attention or the notice is delivered at the person's place of residence or place of business or at another location held out by the person as a place of delivery of communications. (2005‑187, s. 1.)

 

§ 50‑43.  Proceedings to compel or stay arbitration.

(a) On a party's application showing an agreement under G.S. 50‑42 and an opposing party's refusal to arbitrate, the court shall order the parties to proceed with the arbitration. If an opposing party denies existence of an agreement to arbitrate, the court shall proceed summarily to determine whether a valid agreement exists and shall order arbitration if it finds for the moving party; otherwise, the application shall be denied.

(b) Upon the application of a party, the court may stay an arbitration proceeding commenced or threatened on a showing that there is no agreement to arbitrate. This issue, when in substantial and bona fide dispute, shall be immediately and summarily tried and the court shall order a stay if it finds for the moving party. If the court finds for the opposing party, the court shall order the parties to go to arbitration. An arbitrator shall decide whether a condition precedent to arbitrability has been fulfilled and whether a contract containing a valid agreement to arbitrate is enforceable. If a party to a judicial proceeding challenges the existence of, or claims that a controversy is not subject to, an agreement to arbitrate, the arbitration proceeding may continue pending final resolution of the issue by the court unless the court otherwise orders.

(c) If an issue referable to arbitration under an alleged agreement is involved in an action or proceeding pending in a court of competent jurisdiction, the application shall be made in that court. Otherwise, the application may be made in any court of competent jurisdiction.

(d) The court shall order a stay in any action or proceeding involving an issue subject to arbitration if an order or an application for arbitration has been made under this section. If the issue is severable, the stay may be with respect to that specific issue only. When the application is made in an action or proceeding, the order compelling arbitration shall include a stay of the court action or proceeding.

(e) An order for arbitration shall not be refused and a stay of arbitration shall not be granted on the ground that the claim in issue lacks merit or because grounds for the claim have not been shown. (1999‑185, s. 1; 2005‑187, s. 2.)

 

§ 50‑44.  Interim relief and interim measures.

(a) In the case of an arbitration where arbitrators have not yet been appointed, or where the arbitrators are unavailable, a party may seek interim relief directly from a court as provided in subsection (c) of this section. Enforcement shall be granted as provided by the law applicable to the type of interim relief sought.

(b) In all other cases a party shall seek interim measures as described in subsection (d) of this section from the arbitrators. A party has no right to seek interim relief from a court, except that a party to an arbitration governed by this Article may request from the court enforcement of the arbitrators' order granting interim measures and review or modification of any interim measures governing child support or child custody.

(c) In connection with an agreement to arbitrate or a pending arbitration, the court may grant under subsection (a) of this section any of the following:

(1) An order of attachment or garnishment;

(2) A temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction;

(3) An order for claim and delivery;

(4) Appointment of a receiver;

(5) Delivery of money or other property into court;

(6) Notice of lis pendens;

(7) Any relief permitted by G.S. 7B‑502, 7B‑1902, 50‑13.5(d), 50‑16.2A, 50‑20(h), 50‑20(i), or 50‑20(i1); or Chapter 50A, Chapter 50B, or Chapter 52C of the General Statutes;

(8) Any relief permitted by federal law or treaties to which the United States is a party; or

(9) Any other order necessary to ensure preservation or availability of assets or documents, the destruction or absence of which would likely prejudice the conduct or effectiveness of the arbitration.

(d) The arbitrators may, at a party's request, order any party to take any interim measures of protection that the arbitrators consider necessary in respect to the subject matter of the dispute, including interim measures analogous to interim relief specified in subsection (c) of this section. The arbitrators may require any party to provide appropriate security, including security for costs as provided in G.S. 50‑51, in connection with interim measures.

(e) In considering a request for interim relief or enforcement of interim relief, any finding of fact of the arbitrators in the proceeding shall be binding on the court, including any finding regarding the probable validity of the claim that is the subject of the interim relief sought or granted, except that the court may review any findings of fact or modify any interim measures governing child support or child custody.

(f) Where the arbitrators have not ruled on an objection to their jurisdiction, the findings of the arbitrators shall not be binding on the court until the court has made an independent finding as to the arbitrators' jurisdiction. If the court rules that the arbitrators do not have jurisdiction, the application for interim relief shall be denied.

(g) Availability of interim relief or interim measures under this section may be limited by the parties' prior written agreement, except for relief pursuant to G.S. 7B‑502, 7B‑1902, 50‑13.5(d), 50‑20(h), 50B‑3, Chapter 52C of the General Statutes; federal law; or treaties to which the United States is a party, whose purpose is to provide immediate, emergency relief or protection.

(h) Arbitrators who have cause to suspect that any child is abused or neglected shall report the case of that child to the director of the department of social services of the county where the child resides or, if the child resides out‑of‑state, of the county where the arbitration is conducted.

(i) A party seeking interim measures, or any other proceeding before the arbitrators, shall proceed in accordance with the agreement to arbitrate. If the agreement to arbitrate does not provide for a method of seeking interim measures, or for other proceedings before the arbitrators, the party shall request interim measures or a hearing by notifying the arbitrators and all other parties of the request. The arbitrators shall notify the parties of the date, time, and place of the hearing.

(j) A party does not waive the right to arbitrate by proceeding under this section. (1999‑185, s. 1; 2005‑187, s. 3.)

 

§ 50‑45.  Appointment of arbitrators; rules for conducting the arbitration.

(a) Unless the parties otherwise agree in writing, a single arbitrator shall be chosen by the parties to arbitrate all matters in dispute.

(b) If the arbitration agreement provides a method of appointment of arbitrators, this method shall be followed. The agreement may provide for appointing one or more arbitrators. Upon the application of a party, the court shall appoint arbitrators in any of the following situations:

(1) The method agreed upon by the parties in the arbitration agreement fails or for any reason cannot be followed.

(2) An arbitrator who has already been appointed fails or is unable to act, and a successor has not been chosen by the parties.

(3) The parties cannot agree on an arbitrator.

(c) Arbitrators appointed by the court have all the powers of those arbitrators specifically named in the agreement. In appointing arbitrators, a court shall consult with prospective arbitrators as to their availability and shall refer to each of the following:

(1) The positions and desires of the parties.

(2) The issues in dispute.

(3) The skill, substantive training, and experience of prospective arbitrators in those issues, including their skill, substantive training, and experience in family law issues.

(4) The availability of prospective arbitrators.

(d) The parties may agree in writing to employ an established arbitration institution to conduct the arbitration. If the agreement does not provide a method for appointment of arbitrators and the parties cannot agree on an arbitrator, the court may appoint an established arbitration institution the court considers qualified in family law arbitration to conduct the arbitration.

(e) The parties may agree in writing on rules for conducting the arbitration. If the parties cannot agree on rules for conducting the arbitration, the arbitrators shall select the rules for conducting the arbitration after hearing all parties and taking particular reference to model rules developed by arbitration institutions or similar sources. If the arbitrators cannot decide on rules for conducting the arbitration, upon application by a party, the court may order use of rules for conducting the arbitration, taking particular reference to model rules developed by arbitration institutions or similar sources.

(f) Arbitrators and established arbitration institutions, whether chosen by the parties or appointed by the court, have the same immunity as judges from civil liability for their conduct in the arbitration.

(g) "Arbitration institution" means any neutral, independent organization, association, agency, board, or commission that initiates, sponsors, or administers arbitration proceedings, including involvement in appointment of arbitrators.

(h) The court may award costs under G.S. 50‑51(f) in connection with applications and other proceedings under this section. (1999‑185, s. 1; 2005‑187, s. 4.)

 

§ 50‑45.1.  Disclosure by arbitrator.

(a) Before accepting appointment, an individual who is requested to serve as an arbitrator, after making a reasonable inquiry, shall disclose to all parties to the agreement to arbitrate and to the arbitration proceeding and to any other arbitrators any known facts that a reasonable person would consider likely to affect the impartiality of the arbitrator in the arbitration proceeding, including:

(1) A financial or personal interest in the outcome of the arbitration proceeding.

(2) An existing or past relationship with any of the parties to the agreement to arbitrate or to the arbitration proceeding, their counsel or representatives, a witness, or other arbitrators.

(b) An arbitrator has a continuing obligation to disclose to all parties to the agreement to arbitrate and to the arbitration proceeding and to any other arbitrators any facts that the arbitrator learns after accepting appointment that a reasonable person would consider likely to affect the impartiality of the arbitrator.

(c) If an arbitrator discloses a fact required by subsection (a) or (b) of this section to be disclosed and a party timely objects to the appointment or continued service of the arbitrator based upon the fact disclosed, the objection may be grounds for vacating an award made by the arbitrator under G.S. 50‑54(a)(2).

(d) If the arbitrator did not disclose a fact as required by subsection (a) or (b) of this section, upon timely objection by a party, the court may vacate an award pursuant to G.S. 50‑54(a)(2).

(e) An arbitrator appointed as a neutral arbitrator who does not disclose a known, direct, and material interest in the outcome of the arbitration proceeding or a known, existing, and substantial relationship with a party is presumed to act with evident partiality under G.S. 50‑54(a)(2).

(f) If the parties to an arbitration proceeding agree to the procedures of an arbitration institution or any other procedures for challenges to arbitrators before an award is made, substantial compliance with those procedures is a condition precedent to a motion to vacate an award on those grounds pursuant to G.S. 50‑54(a)(2). (2005‑187, s. 5.)

 

§ 50‑46.  Majority action by arbitrators.

The arbitrators' powers shall be exercised by a majority unless otherwise provided by the parties' written arbitration agreement or this Article. (1999‑185, s. 1; 2005‑187, s. 6.)

 

§ 50‑47.  Hearing.

Unless otherwise provided by the parties' written agreement:

(1) The arbitrators shall appoint a time and place for the hearing and notify the parties or their counsel by personal service or by registered or certified mail, return receipt requested, not less than five days before the hearing. Appearance of a party at the hearing waives any claim of deficiency of notice. The arbitrators may adjourn the hearing from time to time as necessary and, on request of a party and for good cause shown, or upon their own motion, may postpone the hearing to a time not later than the date fixed by the written agreement for making the award unless the parties consent to a later date. The arbitrators may hear and determine the controversy upon the evidence produced notwithstanding the failure of a party duly notified to appear. Upon application of a party, the court may direct the arbitrators to proceed promptly with the hearing and determination of the controversy.

(2) The parties are entitled to be heard, to present evidence material to the controversy, and to cross‑examine witnesses appearing at the hearing.

(3) All the arbitrators shall conduct the hearing, but a majority may determine any question and may render a final award. If, during the course of the hearing, an arbitrator for any reason ceases to act, the remaining arbitrators appointed to act as neutrals may continue with the hearing and determination of the controversy.

(4) Upon request of any party or at the election of any arbitrator, the arbitrators shall cause to be made a record of testimony and evidence introduced at the hearing. The arbitrators shall decide how the cost of the record will be apportioned. (1999‑185, s. 1; 2005‑187, s. 7.)

 

§ 50‑48.  Representation by attorney.

A party has the right to be represented by counsel at any proceeding or hearing under this Article. A waiver of representation prior to a proceeding or hearing is ineffective. (1999‑185, s. 1.)

 

§ 50‑49.  Witnesses; subpoenas; depositions; court assistance.

(a) The arbitrators have the power to administer oaths and may issue subpoenas for attendance of witnesses and for production of books, records, documents, and other evidence. Subpoenas issued by the arbitrators shall be served and, upon application to the court by a party or the arbitrators, enforced in the manner provided by law for service and enforcement of subpoenas in a civil action.

(b) On the application of a party and for use as evidence, the arbitrators may permit depositions to be taken in the manner and upon the terms the arbitrators designate.

(c) All provisions of law compelling a person under subpoena to testify apply.

(d) The arbitrators or a party with the approval of the arbitrators may request assistance from the court in obtaining discovery and taking evidence, in which event the Rules of Civil Procedure under Chapter 1A of the General Statutes and Chapters 50, 50A, 52B, and 52C of the General Statutes apply. The court may execute the request within its competence and according to its rules on discovery and evidence and may impose sanctions for failure to comply with its orders.

(e) A subpoena may be issued as provided by G.S. 8‑59, in which case the witness compensation provisions of G.S. 6‑51, 6‑53, and 7A‑314 shall apply. (1999‑185, s. 1.)

 

§ 50‑50: Repealed by Session Laws 2005‑187, s. 8, effective October 1, 2005.

 

§ 50‑50.1.  Consolidation.

(a) Except as otherwise provided in subsection (c) of this section, upon motion of a party to an agreement or arbitration proceeding, the court may order consolidation of separate arbitration proceedings as to all or some of the claims if all of the following apply:

(1) There are separate agreements to arbitrate or separate arbitration proceedings between the same parties or one of them is a party to a separate agreement to arbitrate or a separate arbitration with a third party.

(2) The claims subject to the agreements to arbitrate arise in substantial part from the same transaction or series of related transactions.

(3) The existence of a common issue of law or fact creates the possibility of conflicting decisions in the separate arbitration proceedings.

(4) Prejudice resulting from a failure to consolidate is not outweighed by the risk of undue delay or prejudice to the rights of or hardship to parties opposing consolidation.

(b) The court may order consolidation of separate arbitration proceedings as to some claims and allow other claims to be resolved in separate arbitration proceedings.

(c) The court shall not order consolidation of the claims of a party to an agreement to arbitrate if the agreement prohibits consolidation. (2005‑187, s. 9.)

 

§ 50‑51.  Award; costs.

(a) The award shall be in writing, dated and signed by the arbitrators joining in the award, with a statement of the place where the arbitration was conducted and the place where the award was made. Where there is more than one arbitrator, the signatures of a majority of the arbitrators suffice, but the reason for any omitted signature shall be stated. The arbitrators shall deliver a copy of the award to each party personally or by registered or certified mail, return receipt requested, or as provided in the parties' written agreement. Time of delivery shall be computed from the date of personal delivery or date of mailing.

(b) Unless the parties otherwise agree in writing, the award shall state the reasons upon which it is based.

(c) Unless the parties otherwise agree in writing, the arbitrators may award interest as provided by law.

(d) The arbitrators in their discretion may award specific performance to a party requesting an award of specific performance when that would be an appropriate remedy.

(e) Unless the parties otherwise agree in writing, the arbitrators may not award punitive damages. If arbitrators award punitive damages, they shall state the award in a record and shall specify facts justifying the award and the amount of the award attributable to punitive damages.

(f) Costs:

(1) Unless the parties otherwise agree in writing, awarding of costs of an arbitration shall be in the arbitrators' discretion.

(2) In making an award of costs, the arbitrators may include any or all of the following as costs:

a. Fees and expenses of the arbitrators, expert witnesses, and translators;

b. Fees and expenses of counsel, to the extent allowed by law unless the parties otherwise agree in writing, and of an institution supervising the arbitration, if any;

c. Any other expenses incurred in connection with the arbitration proceedings;

d. Sanctions awarded by the arbitrators or the court, including those provided by N.C.R. Civ. P. 11 and 37; and

e. Costs allowed by Chapters 6 and 7A of the General Statutes.

(3) In making an award of costs, the arbitrators shall specify each of the following:

a. The party entitled to costs;

b. The party who shall pay costs;

c. The amount of costs or method of determining that amount; and

d. The manner in which costs shall be paid.

(g) An award shall be made within the time fixed by the agreement. If no time is fixed by the agreement, the award shall be made within the time the court orders on a party's application. The parties may extend the time in writing either before or after the expiration of this time. A party waives objection that an award was not made within the time required unless that party notifies the arbitrators of his or her objection prior to delivery of the award to that party. (1999‑185, s. 1; 2005‑187, s. 10.)

 

§ 50‑52.  Change of award by arbitrators.

(a) On a party's application to the arbitrators or, if an application to the court is pending under G.S. 50‑53 through G.S. 50‑56, on submission to the arbitrators by the court under the conditions ordered by the court, the arbitrators may modify or correct the award for any of the following reasons:

(1) Upon grounds stated in G.S. 50‑55(a)(1) and (a)(3).

(2) If the arbitrators have not made a final and definite award upon a claim submitted by the parties to the arbitration proceeding.

(3) To clarify the award.

(b) The application shall be made within 20 days after delivery of the award to the opposing party. The application must include a statement that the opposing party must serve any objections to the application within 10 days from notice. An award modified or corrected under this section is subject to the provisions of G.S. 50‑51(a) through G.S. 50‑51(f) and G.S. 50‑53 through G.S. 50‑56. (1999‑185, s. 1; 2005‑187, s. 11.)

 

§ 50‑53.  Confirmation of award.

(a) Unless the parties otherwise agree in writing that part or all of an award shall not be confirmed by the court, upon a party's application, the court shall confirm an award, except when within time limits imposed under G.S. 50‑54 through G.S. 50‑56 grounds are urged for vacating or modifying or correcting the award, in which case the court shall proceed as provided in G.S. 50‑54 through G.S. 50‑56.

(b) The court may award costs, as provided in G.S. 50‑51(f), of the application and subsequent proceedings. (1999‑185, s. 1; 2003‑61, s. 1; 2005‑187, s. 12.)

 

§ 50‑54.  Vacating an award.

(a) Upon a party's application, the court shall vacate an award for any of the following reasons:

(1) The award was procured by corruption, fraud, or other undue means;

(2) There was evident partiality by an arbitrator appointed as a neutral, corruption of an arbitrator, or misconduct prejudicing the rights of a party;

(3) The arbitrators exceeded their powers;

(4) The arbitrators refused to postpone the hearing upon a showing of sufficient cause for the postponement, refused to hear evidence material to the controversy, or otherwise conducted the hearing contrary to the provisions of G.S. 50‑47;

(5) There was no arbitration agreement, the issue was not adversely determined in proceedings under G.S. 50‑43, and the party did not participate in the arbitration hearing without raising the objection. The fact that the relief awarded either could not or would not be granted by a court is not a ground for vacating or refusing to confirm the award;

(6) The court determines that the award for child support or child custody is not in the best interest of the child. The burden of proof at a hearing under this subdivision is on the party seeking to vacate the arbitrator's award;

(7) The award included punitive damages, and the court determines that the award for punitive damages is clearly erroneous; or

(8) If the parties contract in an arbitration agreement for judicial review of errors of law in the award, the court shall vacate the award if the arbitrators have committed an error of law prejudicing a party's rights.

(b) An application under this section shall be made within 90 days after delivery of a copy of the award to the applicant. If the application is predicated on corruption, fraud, or other undue means, it shall be made within 90 days after these grounds are known or should have been known.

(c) In vacating an award on grounds other than stated in subdivision (5) of subsection (a) of this section, the court may order a rehearing before arbitrators chosen as provided in the agreement, or in the absence of a provision regarding the appointment of arbitrators, by the court in accordance with G.S. 50‑45, except in the case of a vacated award for child support or child custody in which case the court may proceed to hear and determine all such issues. The time within which the agreement requires an award to be made applies to the rehearing and commences from the date of the order.

(d) The court shall confirm the award and may award costs of the application and subsequent proceedings under G.S. 50‑51(f) if an application to vacate is denied, no motion to modify or correct the award is pending, and the parties have not agreed in writing that the award shall not be confirmed under G.S. 50‑53. (1999‑185, s. 1; 2005‑187, s. 13.)

 

§ 50‑55.  Modification or correction of award.

(a) Upon application made within 90 days after delivery of a copy of an award to an applicant, the court shall modify or correct the award where at least one of the following occurs:

(1) There is an evident miscalculation of figures or an evident mistake in the description of a person, thing, or property referred to in the award;

(2) The arbitrators have awarded upon a matter not submitted to them, and the award may be corrected without affecting the merits of the decision upon the issues submitted; or

(3) The award is imperfect in a matter of form, not affecting the merits of the controversy.

(b) If the application is granted, the court shall modify or correct the award to effect its intent and shall confirm the award as modified or corrected. Otherwise, the court shall confirm the award as made.

(c) An application to modify or correct an award may be joined in the alternative with an application to vacate the award.

(d) The court may award costs, as provided in G.S. 50‑51(f), of the application and subsequent proceedings. (1999‑185, s. 1.)

 

§ 50‑56.  Modification of award for alimony, postseparation support, child support, or child custody based on substantial change of circumstances.

(a) A court or the arbitrators may modify an award for postseparation support, alimony, child support, or child custody under conditions stated in G.S. 50‑13.7 and G.S. 50‑16.9 as provided in subsections (b) through (f) of this section.

(b) Unless the parties have agreed in writing that an award for postseparation support or alimony shall be nonmodifiable, an award by arbitrators for postseparation support or alimony under G.S. 50‑16.2A, 50‑16.3A, 50‑16.4, or 50‑16.7 may be modified if a court order for alimony or postseparation support could be modified under G.S. 50‑16.9.

(c) An award by arbitrators for child support or child custody may be modified if a court order for child support or child custody could be modified under G.S. 50‑13.7.

(d) If an award for modifiable postseparation support or alimony, or an award for child support or child custody, has not been confirmed under G.S. 50‑53, upon the parties' written agreement these matters may be submitted to arbitrators chosen by the parties under G.S. 50‑45. G.S. 50‑52 through G.S. 50‑56 shall apply to this modified award.

(e) If an award for modifiable postseparation support or alimony, or an award for child support or child custody has been confirmed pursuant to G.S. 50‑53, upon the parties' agreement in writing and joint motion, the court may remit these matters to arbitrators chosen by the parties as provided in G.S. 50‑45, in which case G.S. 50‑52 through G.S. 50‑56 apply to this modified award.

(f) Except as otherwise provided in this section, the provisions of G.S. 50‑55 apply to modifications or corrections of awards for postseparation support, alimony, child support, or child custody. (1999‑185, s. 1; 2005‑187, s. 14.)

 

§ 50‑57.  Orders or judgments on award.

(a) Upon granting an order confirming, modifying, or correcting an award, an order or judgment shall be entered in conformity with the order and docketed and enforced as any other order or judgment. The court may award costs, as provided in G.S. 50‑51(f), of the application and of proceedings subsequent to the application and disbursements.

(b) Notwithstanding G.S. 7A‑109, 7A‑276.1, or 132‑1 or similar law, the court, in its discretion, may order that any arbitration award or order or any judgment or court order entered as a court order or judgment under this Article, or any part of the arbitration award or order or judgment or court order, be sealed, to be opened only upon order of the court upon good cause shown. Upon good cause shown, the court may order resealing of the opened arbitration awards or orders or judgments or court orders. The court, in its discretion, may order that any arbitration award or order or any judgment or court order entered as a court order or judgment under this Article, or any part of the arbitration award or order or judgment or court order, be redacted, the redactions to be opened only upon order of the court upon good cause shown. Upon good cause shown, the court may order redaction of the previously redacted arbitration awards or orders or judgments or court orders opened under the court's order. (1999‑185, s. 1; 2005‑187, s. 15.)

 

§ 50‑58.  Applications to the court.

Except as otherwise provided, an application to a court under this Article shall be by motion and shall be heard in the manner and upon notice provided by law or rule of court for making and hearing motions in civil actions. Unless the parties otherwise agree in writing, notice of an initial application for an order shall be served in the manner provided by law for service of summons in civil actions. (1999‑185, s. 1; 2005‑187, s. 16.)

 

§ 50‑59.  Court; jurisdiction; other definitions.

(a) The term "court" means a court of competent jurisdiction of this State. Making an agreement in this State described in G.S. 50‑42 or any agreement providing for arbitration in this State or under its laws confers jurisdiction on the court to enforce the agreement under this Article and to enter judgment on an award under the agreement.

(b) The term "person" means an individual, corporation, business trust, estate, trust, partnership, limited liability company, association, joint venture, government, governmental subdivision, agency or instrumentality, public corporation, or any other legal or commercial entity. (1999‑185, s. 1; 2005‑187, s. 17.)

 

§ 50‑60.  Appeals.

(a) An appeal may be based on failure to comply with the procedural aspects of this Article. An appeal may be taken from any of the following:

(1) An order denying an application to compel arbitration made under G.S. 50‑43;

(2) An order granting an application to stay arbitration made under G.S. 50‑43(b);

(3) An order confirming or denying confirmation of an award;

(4) An order modifying or correcting an award;

(5) An order vacating an award without directing a rehearing; or

(6) A judgment entered pursuant to provisions of this Article.

(b) Unless the parties contract in an arbitration agreement for judicial review of errors of law as provided in G.S. 50‑54(a), a party may not appeal on the basis that the arbitrator failed to apply correctly the law under Chapters 50, 50A, 52B, or 52C of the General Statutes.

(c) The appeal shall be taken in the manner and to the same extent as from orders or judgments in a civil action. (1999‑185, s. 1.)

 

§ 50‑61.  Article not retroactive.

This Article applies to agreements made on or after October 1, 1999, unless parties by separate written agreement after that date state that this Article shall apply to agreements dated before October 1, 1999. (1999‑185, s. 1; 2005‑187, s. 18.)

 

§ 50‑62.  Construction; uniformity of interpretation.

(a) Certain provisions of this Article have been adapted from the Uniform Arbitration Act formerly in force in this State, the Revised Uniform Arbitration Act in force in this State, the North Carolina International Commercial Arbitration and Conciliation Act, and Chapters 50, 50A, 50B, 51, 52, and 52C of the General Statutes. This Article shall be construed to effect its general purpose to make uniform provisions of these Acts and Chapters 50, 50A, 50B, 51, 52, 52B, and 52C of the General Statutes.

(b) The provisions of this Article governing the legal effect, validity, or enforceability of electronic records or electronic signatures, or of contracts performed with the use of these records or signatures, conform to the requirements of section 102 of the Electronic Signatures in Global and National Commerce Act, 15 U.S.C. § 7001, et seq., or as otherwise authorized by federal or State law governing these electronic records or electronic signatures. (1999‑185, s. 1; 2005‑187, s. 19.)

 

§§ 50‑63 through 50‑69: Reserved for future codification purposes. (2003‑371, s. 1.)

 

Article 4.

Collaborative Law Proceedings.

§ 50‑70.  Collaborative law.

As an alternative to judicial disposition of issues arising in a civil action under this Article, except for a claim for absolute divorce, on a written agreement of the parties and their attorneys, a civil action may be conducted under collaborative law procedures as set forth in this Article. (2003‑371, s. 1.)

 

§ 50‑71.  Definitions.

As used in this article, the following terms mean:

(1) Collaborative law. – A procedure in which a husband and wife who are separated and are seeking a divorce, or are contemplating separation and divorce, and their attorneys agree to use their best efforts and make a good faith attempt to resolve their disputes arising from the marital relationship on an agreed basis. The procedure shall include an agreement by the parties to attempt to resolve their disputes without having to resort to judicial intervention, except to have the court approve the settlement agreement and sign the orders required by law to effectuate the agreement of the parties as the court deems appropriate. The procedure shall also include an agreement where the parties' attorneys agree not to serve as litigation counsel, except to ask the court to approve the settlement agreement.

(2) Collaborative law agreement. – A written agreement, signed by a husband and wife and their attorneys, that contains an acknowledgement by the parties to attempt to resolve the disputes arising from their marriage in accordance with collaborative law procedures.

(3) Collaborative law procedures. – The process for attempting to resolve disputes arising from a marriage as set forth in this Article.

(4) Collaborative law settlement agreement. – An agreement entered into between a husband and wife as a result of collaborative law procedures that resolves the disputes arising from the marriage of the husband and wife.

(5) Third‑party expert. – A person, other than the parties to a collaborative law agreement, hired pursuant to a collaborative law agreement to assist the parties in the resolution of their disputes. (2003‑371, s. 1.)

 

§ 50‑72.  Agreement requirements.

A collaborative law agreement must be in writing, signed by all the parties to the agreement and their attorneys, and must include provisions for the withdrawal of all attorneys involved in the collaborative law procedure if the collaborative law procedure does not result in settlement of the dispute. (2003‑371, s. 1.)

 

§ 50‑73.  Tolling of time periods.

A validly executed collaborative law agreement shall toll all legal time periods applicable to legal rights and issues under law between the parties for the amount of time the collaborative law agreement remains in effect. This section applies to any applicable statutes of limitations, filing deadlines, or other time limitations imposed by law or court rule, including setting a hearing or trial in the case, imposing discovery deadlines, and requiring compliance with scheduling orders. (2003‑371, s. 1.)

 

§ 50‑74.  Notice of collaborative law agreement.

(a) No notice shall be given to the court of any collaborative law agreement entered into prior to the filing of a civil action under this Article.

(b) If a civil action is pending, a notice of a collaborative law agreement, signed by the parties and their attorneys, shall be filed with the court. After the filing of a notice of a collaborative law agreement, the court shall take no action in the case, including dismissal, unless the court is notified in writing that the parties have done one of the following:

(1) Failed to reach a collaborative law settlement agreement.

(2) Both voluntarily dismissed the action.

(3) Asked the court to enter a judgment or order to make the collaborative law settlement agreement an act of the court in accordance with G.S. 50‑75. (2003‑371, s. 1.)

 

§ 50‑75.  Judgment on collaborative law settlement agreement.

A party is entitled to an entry of judgment or order to effectuate the terms of a collaborative law settlement agreement if the agreement is signed by each party to the agreement. (2003‑371, s. 1.)

 

§ 50‑76.  Failure to reach settlement; disposition by court; duty of attorney to withdraw.

(a) If the parties fail to reach a settlement and no civil action has been filed, either party may file a civil action, unless the collaborative law agreement first provides for the use of arbitration or alternative dispute resolution.

(b) If a civil action is pending and the collaborative law procedures do not result in a collaborative law settlement agreement, upon notice to the court, the court may enter orders as appropriate, free of the restrictions of G.S. 50‑74(b).

(c) If a civil action is filed or set for trial pursuant to subsection (a) or (b) of this section, the attorneys representing the parties in the collaborative law proceedings may not represent either party in any further civil proceedings and shall withdraw as attorney for either party. (2003‑371, s. 1.)

 

§ 50‑77.  Privileged and inadmissible evidence.

(a) All statements, communications, and work product made or arising from a collaborative law procedure are confidential and are inadmissible in any court proceeding. Work product includes any written or verbal communications or analysis of any third‑party experts used in the collaborative law procedure.

(b) All communications and work product of any attorney or third‑party expert hired for purposes of participating in a collaborative law procedure shall be privileged and inadmissible in any court proceeding, except by agreement of the parties. (2003‑371, s. 1.)

 

§ 50‑78.  Alternate dispute resolution permitted.

Nothing in this Article shall be construed to prohibit the parties from using, by mutual agreement, other forms of alternate dispute resolution, including mediation or binding arbitration, to reach a settlement on any of the issues included in the collaborative law agreement. The parties' attorneys for the collaborative law proceeding may also serve as counsel for any form of alternate dispute resolution pursued as part of the collaborative law agreement. (2003‑371, s. 1.)

 

§ 50‑79.  Collaborative law procedures surviving death.

Consistent with G.S. 50‑20(l), the personal representative of the estate of a deceased spouse may continue a collaborative law procedure with respect to equitable distribution that has been initiated by a collaborative law agreement prior to death, notwithstanding the death of one of the spouses. The provisions of G.S. 50‑73 shall apply to time limits applicable under G.S. 50‑20(l) for collaborative law procedures continued pursuant to this section. (2003‑371, s. 1.)

 

§ 50‑80: Reserved for future codification purposes.

 

§ 50‑81: Reserved for future codification purposes.

 

§ 50‑82: Reserved for future codification purposes.

 

§ 50‑83: Reserved for future codification purposes.

 

§ 50‑84: Reserved for future codification purposes.

 

§ 50‑85: Reserved for future codification purposes.

 

§ 50‑86: Reserved for future codification purposes.

 

§ 50‑87: Reserved for future codification purposes.

 

§ 50‑88: Reserved for future codification purposes.

 

§ 50‑89: Reserved for future codification purposes.

 

Article 5.

Parenting Coordinator.

§ 50‑90.  Definitions.

As used in this Article, the following terms mean:

(1) High‑conflict case. – A child custody action involving minor children brought under Article 1 of this Chapter where the parties demonstrate an ongoing pattern of any of the following:

a. Excessive litigation.

b. Anger and distrust.

c. Verbal abuse.

d. Physical aggression or threats of physical aggression.

e. Difficulty communicating about and cooperating in the care of the minor children.

f. Conditions that in the discretion of the court warrant the appointment of a parenting coordinator.

(2) Minor child. – A person who is less than 18 years of age and who is not married or legally emancipated.

(3) Parenting coordinator. – An impartial person who meets the qualifications of G.S. 50‑93.

(4) Party. – Any person granted legal or physical custodial rights to a child in a child custody action. (2005‑228, s. 1; 2019‑172, s. 2.)

 

§ 50‑91.  Appointment of parenting coordinator.

(a) The court may appoint or reappoint a parenting coordinator at any time in a child custody action involving minor children brought under Article 1 of this Chapter on or after the entry of a custody order, other than an ex parte order, or upon entry of a contempt order involving a custody issue pursuant to any of the following:

(1) All parties consent to the appointment and the scope of the parenting coordinator's authority.

(2) Upon motion of a party requesting the appointment of a parenting coordinator.

(3) Upon the court's own motion.

(b) If the parties have not consented to the appointment of a parenting coordinator, the court shall make specific findings that the action is a high‑conflict case, that the appointment of the parenting coordinator is in the best interests of any minor child in the case, and that the parties are able to pay for the cost of the parenting coordinator. The court does not have to find a substantial change of circumstance has occurred to appoint a parenting coordinator.

(c) The order appointing a parenting coordinator shall specify the terms of the appointment and the issues the parenting coordinator is directed to assist the parties in resolving and deciding. Notwithstanding the appointment of a parenting coordinator, the court shall retain exclusive jurisdiction to determine fundamental issues of custody, visitation, and support, and the authority to exercise management and control of the case.

(d) The parenting coordinator shall be selected from a list maintained by the district court. Prior to the appointment, the court, the parties' attorneys, or the parties shall contact the parenting coordinator to determine if the parenting coordinator is willing and able to accept the appointment. (2005‑228, s. 1; 2019‑172, s. 2.)

 

§ 50‑92.  Authority of parenting coordinator.

(a) The authority of a parenting coordinator shall be specified in the court order appointing the parenting coordinator and shall be limited to matters that will aid the parties in complying with the court's custody order, resolving disputes regarding issues that were not specifically addressed in the custody order, or ambiguous or conflicting terms in the custody order. The parenting coordinator's scope of authority may include, but is not limited to, any of the following areas:

(1) Transition time, pickup, or delivery.

(2) Sharing of vacations and holidays.

(3) Method of pickup and delivery.

(4) Transportation to and from visitation.

(5) Participation in child or day care and babysitting.

(6) Bed time.

(7) Diet.

(8) Clothing.

(9) Recreation.

(10) Before‑ and after‑school activities.

(11) Extracurricular activities.

(12) Discipline.

(13) Health care management.

(14) Alterations in schedule that do not substantially interfere with the basic time‑share agreement.

(15) Participation in visitation, including significant others or relatives.

(16) Telephone contact.

(17) Alterations to appearance, including tattoos or piercings.

(18) The child's passport.

(19) Education.

(20) Other areas of specific authority as designated by the court or the parties.

(b) The parenting coordinator shall decide any issue within the scope of the parenting coordinator's authority, and the decision shall be enforceable as an order of the court. The decision shall be in writing and provided to the parties and their attorneys. So long as the custody order under which the decision is made is in effect, the decision shall remain binding after the expiration of the parenting coordinator's term unless the parenting coordinator or a subsequent parenting coordinator modifies the decision or the court reviews and modifies the decision.

(b1) Any party or attorney for the party may file a motion for the court to review a parenting coordinator's decision. The parties shall comply with the parenting coordinator's decision unless the court, after a review hearing, determines that (i) the parenting coordinator's decision is not in the child's best interests or (ii) the decision exceeded the scope of the parenting coordinator's authority. The moving party or the attorney for the moving party shall cause a subpoena to be issued for the parenting coordinator's attendance at the review hearing. At the conclusion of the review hearing, the court shall determine how the parenting coordinator's fees, as related to the review hearing, shall be apportioned between the parties. The court may review and modify a parenting coordinator's decision after the expiration of a parenting coordinator's term.

(c) The parenting coordinator shall not provide any professional services or counseling to any party or any of the minor children.

(d) The parenting coordinator shall refer financial issues related to the parenting coordinator's decisions to the parties or their attorneys. (2005‑228, s. 1; 2019‑172, s. 2.)

 

§ 50‑93.  Qualifications.

(a) To be eligible to be included on the district court's list of parenting coordinators, a person must meet all of the following requirements:

(1) Hold a masters or doctorate degree in psychology, law, social work, or counseling.

(2) Have at least five years of related professional post‑degree experience.

(3) Hold a current North Carolina license in the parenting coordinator's area of practice.

(4) Participate in 24 hours of training in topics related to the developmental stages of children, the dynamics of high‑conflict families, the stages and effects of divorce, problem solving techniques, mediation, and legal issues.

(b) In order to remain eligible as a parenting coordinator, the person must also attend parenting coordinator seminars that provide continuing education, group discussion, and peer review and support. (2005‑228, s. 1; 2019‑172, s. 2.)

 

§ 50‑94.  Appointment conference.

(a) The parties, their attorneys, and the proposed parenting coordinator must all attend the appointment conference. However, no appointment conference is required if (i) the parenting coordinator's term is later extended, (ii) a subsequent parenting coordinator is appointed in the same matter, or (iii) the parties, their attorneys, and the proposed parenting coordinator consent to a waiver of the appointment conference by signing the proposed appointment order. The court shall not enter an order appointing a parenting coordinator or conduct an appointment conference unless a custody order has already been entered or is being simultaneously entered.

(b) At the time of the appointment conference, the court shall do all of the following:

(1) Explain to the parties the parenting coordinator's role, authority, and responsibilities as specified in the appointment order and any agreement entered into by the parties.

(2) Repealed by Session Laws 2019‑172, s. 2, effective October 1, 2019.

(3) Determine financial arrangements for the parenting coordinator's fee to be paid by each party and authorize the parenting coordinator to charge any party separately for individual contacts made necessary by that party's behavior.

(4) Inform the parties, their attorneys, and the parenting coordinator of the rules regarding communications among them and with the court.

(5) Enter the appointment order if the order has not yet been entered.

(c) Repealed by Session Laws 2019‑172, s. 2, effective October 1, 2019. (2005‑228, s. 1; 2019‑172, s. 2.)

 

§ 50‑95.  Fees.

(a) The parenting coordinator shall be entitled to reasonable compensation from the parties for services rendered and to a reasonable retainer. If a dispute arises regarding the payment of fees or the retainer, the parenting coordinator may file a fee report and request a hearing. If a party disputes the parenting coordinator's fees or the allocation of those fees, the party may file a motion with the court requesting that the court review the fees. The district court retains jurisdiction to resolve disputes regarding the parenting coordinator's fees after the conclusion of the parenting coordinator's term so long as the parenting coordinator's fee report was filed in a timely manner.

(b) Repealed by Session Laws 2019‑172, s. 2, effective October 1, 2019. (2005‑228, s. 1; 2019‑172, s. 2.)

 

§ 50‑96.  Meetings and communications.

Meetings and communications between the parenting coordinator and the parties, the attorneys for the parties, or any other person with information that assists the parenting coordinator in the coordinator's duties may be informal and ex parte. Communications between the parties and the parenting coordinator are not confidential. The parenting coordinator and the court shall not engage in any ex parte communications. Upon request of the parenting coordinator, the parties shall timely execute any releases necessary to facilitate communication with any person having information that assists the parenting coordinator in the coordinator's duties. The parenting coordinator, in the coordinator's discretion, may meet or communicate with the minor children. (2005‑228, s. 1; 2019‑172, s. 2.)

 

§ 50‑97.  Reports.

(a) The parenting coordinator may file a report with the court regarding any of the following:

(1) The parenting coordinator's belief that the existing custody order is not in the best interests of the child.

(2) The parenting coordinator's determination that the parenting coordinator is not qualified to address or resolve certain issues in the case.

(3) A party's noncompliance with a decision of the parenting coordinator or the terms of the custody order.

(4) The parenting coordinator's fees as set forth in G.S. 50‑95.

(5) The parenting coordinator's request that the parenting coordinator's appointment be modified or terminated.

(b) Upon the filing of a verified report by the parenting coordinator alleging that a party is not complying with a decision of the parenting coordinator, not complying with the terms of the custody order, or not paying the parenting coordinator's fees, the court may issue an order directing a party to appear at a specified reasonable time and show cause why the party shall not be held in contempt. Nothing in this section prevents a party from filing the party's own motion regarding noncompliance with a parenting coordinator's decision or noncompliance with the terms of the custody order.

(c) An expedited hearing shall be granted and shall occur within four weeks of the filing of the report unless the parenting coordinator requests a longer length of time or the court has already issued an order directing a party to show cause why the party shall not be held in contempt.

(d) The court, after a hearing on the parenting coordinator's report, shall be authorized to issue temporary custody orders as may be required for a child's best interests. (2005‑228, s. 1; 2019‑172, s. 2.)

 

§ 50‑98.  Parenting coordinator records.

(a) In the parenting coordinator's discretion, the parenting coordinator may release any records held by the parenting coordinator to the parties or the attorneys for the parties.

(b) Any party may apply to the judge presiding for the issuance of a subpoena to compel production of the parenting coordinator's records. Any party who submits an application for a subpoena shall provide reasonable notice to the parenting coordinator and the parties so that any objection to the release of information or the manner of the release of information may be considered prior to the issuance of a subpoena. (2005‑228, s. 1; 2019‑172, s. 2.)

 

§ 50‑99.  Modification or termination of parenting coordinator appointment.

(a) For good cause shown, the court may terminate or modify the parenting coordinator appointment upon motion of any party, upon the agreement of the parties, or by the court on its own motion.

(b) For good cause shown, the court may modify or terminate the parenting coordinator's appointment upon request of the parenting coordinator as set forth in G.S. 50‑97(a)(5).

(c) For purposes of termination or modification of the parenting coordinator's appointment, good cause may include, but is not limited to, any of the following:

(1) The lack of reasonable progress.

(2) A determination that the parties no longer need the assistance of a parenting coordinator.

(3) Impairment on the part of a party that significantly interferes with the party's participation in the process.

(4) The inability or unwillingness of the parenting coordinator to continue to serve. (2005‑228, s. 1; 2019‑172, s. 2.)

 

§ 50‑100.  Parenting coordinator immunity.

A parenting coordinator shall not be liable for damages for acts or omissions of ordinary negligence arising out of that person's duties and responsibilities as a parenting coordinator. This section does not apply to actions arising out of the operation of a motor vehicle. (2005‑228, s. 1.)